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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are assaulted by a person threatening you with deadly
force. May you lawfully respond, in turn, with deadly force? You don't yet
know enough facts to determine the legality of the use of lethal force, so the
answer is "it depends." If the person threatening you with deadly force is a
police officer, and you are fleeing after committing a violent felony, the
answer is undoubtedly no; if you are an innocent victim and the assailant
intends to rob you at gunpoint, the answer is probably yes. Facts provide the
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Eugene Volokh and to participants in the University of Miami School of Law Faculty
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frame that contextualizes an event and helps us understand the justice of the
legal rules that apply to it.
Suppose, once again, that you are assaulted by a person threatening you
with deadly force. But, looking further back in time, imagine that you wound
up in that situation because you chose to enter into, rather than avoid, a
potentially risky situation. Imagine, for example, that a friend told you that
the assailant, a longtime enemy, was looking for you, had a gun, and planned
to spend the evening at a local club. You replied, "Who cares? I'm not afraid
of him. If he tries to start something with me, he'll be sorry," and headed off
to the very same club. Once there, the assailant threatened you with lethal
force. May you respond with lethal force in self-defense?
Some might say that, by going to the club where you knew the assailant
might be, you were "looking for trouble." Should that affect whether you can
claim self-defense? Should legal analysis of a self-defense situation permit
consideration of an expanded time frame, in which the prior conduct of the
actors may preclude their right to act in self-defense? Or should the question
about the legal justification of an act of self-defense turn on the narrow
circumstances of the ultimate violent interaction, without an inquiry into
whether prior behavior by the actor claiming self-defense precipitated a
confrontation that could have been avoided? In other words, how should we
"frame" the incident in which an actor claims the right to act violently in
self-defense?
One might think that the answer to this question would be clear: either
the law should draw the frame broadly, to include those facts, or draw it
narrowly, to exclude them. Most commentators seem to think that the law is
clear on this issue. As it turns out, however, the law is decidedly ambiguous
about this problem. This lack of clarity has far-reaching implications. The
problem of framing an incident of the use of force in self-defense is
ubiquitous; any time we consider whether a person properly used force in
self-defense, we must decide how far back, both in time and circumstance,
we will look to consider how the actor came to be in the situation in which
force became necessary.
The problem fits into a broader analysis of what Prof. Mark Kelman has
called "time-framing"' in the substantive criminal law. Prof. Kelman terms
this an "unconscious interpretive construct," a way of shaping how the law
views an incident that decisionmakers do not articulate, describe, or jUStify'.2
IMark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN. L. REv. 591, 593-94 (1980-81). For a short paper by Prof. Kelman advancing
these arguments and a series of responsive comments, including one by the author, see
Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, in CRINMAL
LAw CONvERSATIONs 207, 207-27 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009).
2 Kelman, supra note 1, at 593-94.
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Prof. Kelman's analysis of the general problem of time-framing invited
further analysis of the issue in the context of a range of different doctrinal
areas. This Article focuses on the problem in the context of the law of self-
defense.
Research suggests that the framing of a decision can have significant
effects on that decision. In the criminal law context, there may not be a
straightforward relationship between the choice of the frame and the likely
outcome. But the decision about the framing convention that we choose will
inevitably affect to a considerable degree the final result. In light of this, the
law should address this problem.
This Article concludes that the law of self-defense should not permit
expanding the frame in order to deny a claim of self-defense to a person
based on prior decisions to engage in lawful conduct that resulted in a violent
encounter. First, the Article sets out the framing issue, and demonstrates that
the law as to whether the frame may be expanded to deprive an actor of a
claim of self-defense is confused and unclear. In some circumstances, the law
permits the expansion of the frame to deny an actor, threatened with
violence, an otherwise viable claim of self-defense. The Article then argues
that the law should not expand the frame to deprive an actor of a claim of
self-defense. Such an expansion permits interference with the actor's
dignitary interest-her freedom to move about freely and to choose where to
go and what to do. It impermissibly permits aggressors to direct the behavior
of others, requiring their victims to avoid confrontations in order to preserve
their right of self-defense. It does so in circumstances in which law
enforcement is unlikely to play a significant role in protecting the actor from
the aggressor. Last of all, the expansion of the frame essentially denies a
justification defense to an actor whose earlier decisions may have been made
with no culpable mental state.
11. THE PROBLEM OF FRAMING
What do we mean by "framing" the self-defense inquiry? A decisionss
frame is the "conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated
with a particular choice."3 As it turns out, how we describe a decision-what
we associate with it and what we treat as irrelevant to it-winds up being
significant to how the decision is made.4
This is evident from research conducted by cognitive psychologists in the
context of probabilistic decisionaking. Decisionmakers express differing
views about choices that are substantively identical when they are framed
3 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahnemari, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (198 1).
4Id
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differently. 5 For example, if a choice is framed as an opportunity to save
lives, decisionmakers opt for that choice more often than another,
probabilistically identical choice framed in terms of the number of lives lost
rather than saved.6 Students of tax policy are more amenable to a tax
exemption for persons with children rather than a tax premium for childless
persons, even though the net result in terms of the tax law is identical. 7
What this tells us more generally is that the framing of a choice affects
the choice; changes in the way an alternative is presented can make the
decisionmaker more or less likely to choose that alternative. 8 This is true
even if the alternatives are, as an objective matter, indistinguishable from one
another. These effects can be significant; "seemingly inconsequential
changes in the formulation of choice problems cause[] significant shifts of
preference." 9 Prospect theorists would call the time-framing issue a problem
of "intertemporal conflict," and recognize that differing temporal
perspectives may affect the decisionmaker's choice.'10
Framing effects need not be purposeful; they can "occur fortuitously,
without anyone being aware of the impact of the frame on the ultimate
decision."'" But because people tend "to evaluate options in relation to the
5 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S25 1, S261 (1986).
6 Id. at S260.
7 Id. at S26 1. For a more nuanced set of data exploring the treatment of bonuses
versus surcharges in a tax scheme, see Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Framing
and Taxation:~ Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household Composition, 25 J. EcON.
PSYcHOL. 679 (2004).
8 This is referred to as the "failure of invariance." See Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 Am. PSYCHOL. 341, 343 (1984). Invariance is
the principle that a rational actor, presented with a decision, would make the same choice
regardless of the way in which the decision is presented. Id. The fact that this is not the
case suggests that the invariance assumption is incorrect and therefore that
decisionmakers are not entirely rational actors. Id. at 343-44. Trial lawyers intuitively
understand this; portraying an interaction between business people as Joe's breach of a
complex contractual provision is less compelling than describing it as a situation in which
Sam relied on Joe's handshake and Joe broke his word.
9 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 3, at 457 ("Individuals who face a decision
problem and have a definite preference (i) might have a different preference in a different
framing of the same problem, [and] (ii) are normally unaware of alternative frames and of
their potential effects on the relative attractiveness of options ....
10 Id.
I IKahneman & Tversky, supra note 8, at 346. They can, of course, "also be
exploited deliberately to manipulate the relative attractiveness of options." Id. For
example, "lobbyists for the credit card industry insisted that any price difference between
cash and credit purchases be labeled a cash discount rather than a credit card surcharge."
Id
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reference point that is suggested or implied by the statement of the
problem,"' 2 how we articulate the self-defense question goes a long way
towards determining how it will be answered.' 3 Specifically, whether
particular events are viewed as linked or not affects the decisions that are
made about them.14 If we suggest to a decisionmaker that an actor's earlier
choices should be linked to later events, the decisionmaker may be more
likely to think they should be.' 5
From this, we can see that the way in which the self-defense problem is
framed-whether broadly, to connect it to prior decisions and choices, or
narrowly, to include only events immediately preceding the use of force for
which self-defense is claimed-may have a significant effect on the
decisionmaker's view of the question. Given the importance of the framing
choice, the -egal system should make conscious decisions about how these
inquiries should be framed; "[w]hen framing influences the experience of
consequences, the adoption of a decision frame is an ethically significant
act."16
Two constraints on the usefulness of the framing literature to the framing
problem in self-defense are worth mentioning. First, in the experimental
context, framing typically creates false distinctions between alternatives that
are identical as a statistical or probabilistic matter-what one author
describes as an "equivalency framing effect."'17 In the self-defense context,
by contrast, the choice of frame may create substantively distinct
alternatives. This context creates more of an "emphasis framing effect,"' 8 in
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., Arlette Grabczynska & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Justifyng Killing in
Self-Defence, 99 J. GRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLoGY 235, 249 (2009) (reviewing FIONA
LEVERICK, KILLING IN SELF-DEFENSE (2006)) (arguing that people's reactions to innocent
aggressor hypotheticals "are subject to framing bias. The hypotheticals are presented in
such a way that one imagines that one is at the bottom of the well or stuck in the elevator
with the psychotic aggressor. But if we truly want to imagine the innocence and lack of
conduct on the threat's part, then we must ask the question from the perspective of the
threat as well." (footnotes omitted)).
14 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 8, at 347-48. For example, when subjects
were asked whether they would buy another $10 theater ticket to see a play if they had
purchased and lost the original $ 10 ticket, 54% indicated that they would not. Id. 88% of
the same subjects said that they would buy a $10 ticket to see a play even if they had lost
$10 that day. Id. The difference, the researchers posited, was what they termed "the
topical organization of mental accounts." Id
15 See id
16 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 3, at 458.
17 James N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen
Competence, 23 POL. BEHAV. 225, 228 (2002).
18 Id. at 230.
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which emphasizing a particular set of facts or interests may cause a
decisionmaker to focus on those facts to the exclusion of others. While the
framing effects in the self-defense context will not reflect irrational
distinctions between indistinguishable choices, they are, nonetheless, subject
to manipulation.' 9 Emphasis framing effects are more significant if only one
frame is offered; 20 in the context of legal decisionmaking, a factfinder may
be told which frame is appropriate, creating little competition between
alternative framing narratives.
Second, in the context of straightforward probabilistic decisions, the way
the question is framed can produce identifiable and predictable categories of
bias. Decisionmakers opt for choices termed risk-averse rather than risk-
seeking; for example, they prefer to bestow benefits rather than impose
penalties, and they prefer the status quo. In the context of self-defense, by
contrast, the framing decision may not consistently bias the decisionmaker in
a predictable and reproducible direction.2'
The way the self-defense issue is framed will affect the decisionmaker,
but there is still a normative choice to be made about which framing choice is
correct. The next section demonstrates that the law is inconsistent and
uncertain about this important substantive question.
111. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE AND THE PROBLEM OF FRAMING
The classic description of self-defense treats as justified the use of
reasonable, proportionate and necessary force in response to an imminent
threat of unlawful force. As described by Prof. LaFave:
One who is not the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using a
reasonable amount of force against his adversary when he reasonably
believes (a) that he is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his
adversary and (b) that the use of such force is necessary to avoid this
danger.22
Deadly force is typically permitted only if the actor "reasonably believes that
the other is about to inflict unlawful death or serious bodily harm upon him
(and also that it is necessary to use deadly force to prevent it)."123 Framing is
19 Id at 235.
20 Id at 244.
21 See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
22 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 (2d ed. 2003).
23 Id at 145. Jurisdictions requiring retreat typically require it only before the use of
deadly force. See id at 155; see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMAINAL LAW
§ 18.01 [B] (5th ed. 2009) ("[Djeadly force is only justified in self-protection if the actor
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an issue in any self-defense case, but, as will become apparent, it presents a
significant legal issue in cases involving lethal self-defense.
Because self-defense is a justification, where the elements of self-defense
are satisfied, the actor who committed the intentional but justified harm is
guilty of no crime. 24 Legal rules that permit or prohibit the assertion of a self-
defense claim accordingly control the outcomes of cases in which they are
applied.
The law as it is articulated above seems to envision as relevant only the
immediate encounter between the actors in which the challenged force is
used. That, as it turns out, is an oversimplification. Under some
circumstances, the law opens the door to a more generalized inquiry into
whether the actor claiming self-defense is somehow to blame for the situation
in which he needed to use force-whether he was "looking for trouble"--and
whether that should deprive him of the right to claim self-defense for what
would otherwise be the lawful use of force.
This expanded frame is the subject of this Article. It is not, however, the
only instance in which self-defense law looks backward in time to events that
preceded the ultimate violent encounter. The following section discusses
these other instances briefly.
A. When Doctrine Looks Backward
Self-defense doctrine looks backward, in part, to address the
complexities that reality imposes on the pristine law of self-defense. Self-
defense cases rarely reflect what one author describes as the "paradigm of
self-defense" 25-"the violator of peace versus the law-abiding citizen, or,
more simply, antagonist versus protagonist, villain versus hero."126 Self-
defense situations are often more complex and ambiguous, involving an
escalation of provocative, aggressive, and unlawful behavior on the part of
both participants in an altercation. 27 This means that the privilege of self-
defense can belong to and be lost repeatedly by each of the participants in a
violent encounter-a dance of shifting privileges, in which each actor can in
reasonably believes that its use is necessary to prevent imminent and unlawful use of
deadly force by the aggressor.").
24 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 10.4(a).
25 See Janine Young Kim, The Rhetoric of Self-Defense, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
261, 265-66 (2008) ("[jT]he sudden assault by a murderous stranger, such as when
someone, perhaps bent on robbery, comes out of a dark alley with a gun and threatens to
kill a person walking innocently down the street." (quoting CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE,
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 4 (1989))).
26 Kim, supra note 25, at 266.
27 Prof. Kim, too, recognizes this, noting that the traditional paradigm "is a scene
that blinds us to the unresolved uncertainties of self-defense." Id at 268.
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turn acquire and lose the right to respond with force to unlawful force exerted
against him. To untangle these difficulties, the law identifies some
simplifying rules which require inquiry not simply into who struck the final
blow, but into what took place before that.
One such rule denies the privilege of self-defense to an initial
aggressor.28 For the initial aggressor to regain the privilege of using deadly
force, she must communicate her intention to withdraw from the violent
encounter fairly to the other actor. Accordingly, a self-defense case requires
looking back in time to determine whether the person claiming self-defense
was the person who started the altercation, and, if so, whether that person
withdrew unequivocally from the encounter.
Another inquiry that may reqqire an analysis of events preceding the
final violent interaction turns on the fact that, to be justified, self-defense can
only be used in response to the threat of unlawful force. In a violent
encounter, determining whether the use of force by one actor is justified, and
therefore lawful, requires analysis of each escalation of force to determine
whether the force used was disproportionate and therefore unlawful.
Imagine, for example, that Al and Bob are at a bar. Bob speaks to Al in a
way that Al perceives as disrespectful, and Al takes offense. Al, a diminutive
man in his sixties, takes a swing at Bob, a tall and strong 35-year-old, in an
attempt to punch him in the stomach. Bob avoids the blow without difficulty,
and responds by punching Al full-force in the face. Al falls to the ground, his
nose broken, and strikes his head on the concrete pavement. Al pulls out a
switchblade knife. Whether Bob may respond to Al's threatened use of lethal
force with lethal force may depend in part on whether his striking Al
constituted a proportionate (and therefore lawful) use of force.29
Another element that requires an inquiry into the events preceding the
final encounter is the requirement, in some jurisdictions, that the actor, in
order to claim self-defense, must not have "provoked" the conflict.30 Some
28 See LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 10.4(e) ("It is generally said that one who is the
aggressor in an encounter with another-i.e., one who brings about the difficulty with the
other-may not avail himself of the defense of self-defense." (footnote omitted)). Prof.
LaFave assumes that "bringing about the difficulty" means being the initial aggressor, but
it is not clear that the term is understood so narrowly. See infra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text.
29 If so, Al would not be privileged to respond to that lawful use of force with lethal
force, and so Al's use of force would be unlawful, entitling Bob to use lethal force in
self-defense.
30 In some jurisdictions, the actor loses his privilege of self-defense only if he
provokes the incident with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury. See, e.g.,
Jeanne E. Neese, Criminal Procedure-Provocation Not a Bar to Self-Defense in
Absence of Intent to Cause Death or Serious Bodily Injury-Commonwealth v. Samuel,
590 A.2dJ1245 (Pa. 1991), 65 TEry. L. REv. 751, 751 (1992) (discussing a case in which
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jurisdictions have broad instructions relating to the issue of provocation,
asking, for example, whether the defendant "provoked or incited the use of
force against (himself/herself) in the same encounter,"31 "provoked another
with the intent to cause the altercation," 32 or "provoked the [deceased's]..
[use] .. . of unlawful force. . . .3
Several issues relevant to a claim of self-defense accordingly require
looking backward to consider the facts that led up to the ultimate violent
encounter. In these situations, however, the inquiry into the past is designed
to ask a distinct, clearly articulated question. The issue this Article addresses
is whether the factfinder can expand the frame to invite a broader and more
diffuse inquiry: whether the actor should have done something to avoid the
situation in which he found himself, and whether that failure should act as a
bar to a subsequent claim of self-defense.
One might think that this obvious framing problem would be clearly
identified and clearly addressed by both legislatures and scholars in the area
of self-defense. As it turns out, that is not the case.
B. The Traditional Understanding: No Expanded Frames Allowed
Contemporary self-defense law is distinctly unclear about how
decisionmakers should frame the encounter in which they assess the
legitimacy of a self-defense claim.3 4 This is not, however, the view of many
commentators, who express the mistaken belief that the law is clear and
precludes expanding the frame.
This understanding of self-defense law comes largely from an expansive
range of early cases and authorities, many dating from the late nineteenth or
a state supreme court required a state to prove "that a defendant intended to cause death
or serious bodily injury to negate the claim of self-defense on the basis of provocation in
homicide cases"). Other provocation instructions limit the provocation exception to
situations in which the victim was the initial aggressor, but the defendant intentionally
brought on the difficulty "for the purpose and with the intent that the defendant would
have a pretext for killing the victim." Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 518 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1998).
31 N.J. MODEL GRIM. JURY CHARGES, N.J.S.A. § 2C:3-4 (2000).
32 OKLA. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CRM. § 8-50 (2006).
33 TEN'N. PATrERN JURY INsTRUCTioNs-CRim. § 40.06 (2006).
34 Framing is relevant to any claim of necessity. Consider, for example, a claim of
police use of force. If the applicable legal rule is that the use of force is justified where it
is "necessary," a dispute about a use of force incident might turn on at what point that
necessity should be assessed. The officer might suggest that at the point at which he used
force, he was threatened by a violent individual and that the use of force was therefore
"1necessary," while the state might assert that certain acts taken by the officer before the
encounter turned violent exacerbated the situation and generated the need for the use of
force.
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early twentieth centuries, in which courts held that a defendant could not be
denied a claim of self-defense based on his prior lawful decisions and
choices. These cases, reflecting a decided flavor of the frontier, focused on
the importance of preserving the individual's right to freedom of action 3 5
They firmly stated the principle that one lawfuilly minding his own business
need not alter his behavior-even in the face of the anticipated aggression of
another-in order to claim self-defense. Courts routinely reversed cases in
which instructions required the defendant to have acted affirmatively to
avoid the entire difficulty. It was error, held one, to instruct the jury that
defendant's
right of self-defense did not arise until he had 'done everything in his power
to avoid the necessity' of slaying his adversary. He might have avoided such
necessity by secreting himself so that he could not be found, or by
abandoning his home and seeking safety in some remote part of the country;
but under the law he was not required to resort to either of these methods of
securing his personal safety.36
One court vehemently rejected an instruction that suggested that by arming
himself and going to where the victim was, the defendant provoked the attack
and could not claim complete self-defense:
Defendant's presence at the place where the killing occurred could not,
under the circumstances, constitute provocation to the deceased. Defendant
had the right to be at that place. It was a public street, and at the entrance to
the house in which he did business. It was his daily habit to be at the place
going to and from his work .... There was nothing wrong-nothing
unusual or strange-in his presence at the place on the occasion of the
killing. With what reason, then, can it be claimed that his presence at the
place provoked, or was calculated to provoke, the deceased to attack him?37
35 Kim, supra note 25, at 266-67 ("[Cjountering unjust violence with just violence
evokes romanticized images of the cowboy or adventurer, defending himself (and
perhaps also his honor) against the perils of the lawless frontier.").
36 Bohannon v. Commonwealth, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 481, 486 (1871).
37 Ball v. State, 14 S.W. 1012, 1013 (Tex. Ct. App. 1890); see also Cheney v. State,
55 So. 801, 802-03 (Ala. 1911), holding it was error not to instruct the jury that:
[iun going to his poolroom the defendant could not be considered as at fault in
bringing on the difficulty. The defendant had the right to go to his place of business
without being placed at fault in bringing on the difficuly.... [Tihere was not the
slightest proof that he provoked the deceased at the time of the homicide, . . . other
than by merely appearing in his own place of business where he had the right to go.).
See also People v. Gonzales, 12 P. 783, 787 (Cal. 1887):
Vol. 71:2296
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The classic statement of the notion that an actor need not avoid an
encounter to be entitled to claim self-defense was articulated in State v.
Gardner:
[A] person knowing his life to be threatened, and believing himself to be in
danger of death or great bodily harm, is not obliged to remain at home in
order to avoid an assault, but may arm himself sufficiently to repel
anticipated attack, and pursue his legitimate avocation; and if without fault,
he is compelled to take life to save himself, he may use any weapon he may
have secured for that purpose, and the homicide is excusable. 38
Even where courts did not expressly articulate this principle, they
rejected any notion that the frame should be expanded to ask whether a
defendant claiming self-defense should have engaged in alternative
avoidance behaviors earlier in the encounter. 39 In State v. Adler, for example,
Adler and Johnson got into an altercation. 40 Adler "retreated, and ran into a
grocery store," but "remained in the store but a very short time."41 When he
returned to the street, he had a revolver in his hand.42 Outside the store was a
mob of about two hundred people.43 The court concluded that Adler, by
entering the store, had abandoned the conflict, and was therefore entitled to
defend himself when he emerged from the store.44 The court did not suggest
that Adler was obliged to choose an alternative course of conduct-such as
[Olne may know that if he travels along a certain highway be [sic] will be attacked
by another with a deadly weapon, and be compelled in self-defense to kill his
assailant, and yet he has the right to travel that highway, and is not compelled to turn
out of his way to avoid the expected unlawfu~l attack.
See also State v. Evans, 28 S.W. 8, 11 (Mo. 1894):
If the mere expectation of an assault from an adversary is to deprive the expectant of
the right of self-defense, merely because he goes armed in the vicinity of his enemy,
or goes out prepared upon the highway where he is likely at any moment to meet
him, then he has armed himself in vain, and self-defense ceases wherever
expectation begins. We do not so understand the law.
38 State v. Gardner, 104 N.W. 971, 975 (Minn. 1905); see also State v. Jackson, 382
P.2d 229, 232 (Ariz. 1963) ("On [sic] who merely does an act which affords an
opportunity for conflict is not thereby precluded from claiming self-defense.").
39 E.g., State v. Adler, 47 S.W. 794, 794-95 (Mo. 1898).
41 Id at 795.
42 Id
43 Id
44Id at 796.
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staying in the store-that would have enabled him to avoid his assailant as
well as the rest of the angry mob. 45
More contemporary authorities, relying largely on these earlier
pronouncements, seem equally assured in their view that self-defense law
does not endorse a broad framing inquiry that looks into the history of the
altercation and imposes on the actor claiming self-defense the obligation to
avoid it.46 Wrote one, "[A] rule that demands the defendant 'avoid the
confrontation' . .. has never been part of standard self-defense law. There is
no general duty to avoid violence before the confrontation."47 These
authorities, for the most part, ground this understanding squarely in the
principle of freedom of movement: that the law of self-defense does not
interfere with the privilege of the actor to go where he chooses.48
The problem with the certainty of these commentators about the framing
issue is that the law is, in fact, decidedly unclear about which of these
diametrically opposite approaches-one that looks back in time to the actor's
45 In State v. Bristol, 84 P.2d 765, 765-67 (Wyo. 1938), the court held it improper
for the jury to conclude that the defendant was deprived of the right to self-defense even
though he went to a restaurant knowing that the victim was there and had threatened her
previously. The court agreed that principles like "[tlhe duty to avoid a difficulty; that one
who kills must not be at fault; that the right to kill is based on the law of necessity .. . are
broad and general terms, and if literally applied would cover the point now before us." Id
at 762. After a lengthy analysis of authorities, the court concluded nonetheless that
"1neither the fact of arming himself nor the fact of going to the restaurant, even if he
knew that the deceased was there, was sufficient to deprive the defendant of the right of
self-defense." Id at 765; see also People v. Macard, 40 N.W. 784, 787 (Mich. 1888)
("The question of... whether respondent could have avoided the threatened
assault ... [was] not for the jury.").
46 See, e.g., ANDREw AsHwoRTH, PRINCIPLES OF CIrvNAL LAW 119 (1991) (no
duty to avoid conflict "in those cases where D is acting lawfully in remaining at, or going
to, a place, realizing that there is a risk that someone will force a violent confrontation
there"); see also Kim, supra note 25, at 284 ("[Tlhe law makes self-defense available to
even gun-toting, racist vigilantes so long as the situation calls for it.").
47 V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1235, 1284 (2001):
A retreat rule may require the defendant to withdraw once the confrontation has
begun, but a rule that demands the defendant "avoid the confrontation" is an entirely
different requirement; such a "pre-retreat" rule is far more severe and, indeed, has
never been part of standard self-defense law. There is no general duty to avoid
violence before the confrontation. The man who goes for the fiftieth time to the
violent gang-bar is not deprived of his self-defense claim because he "should have
left before the violence erupted.
48 See id at 1284 ("[Tlhe common law of self-defense protects the freedom to
move."); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1131 (3d ed. 1982)
("The fact that one who has been threatened arms himself for defense does not deprive
him of the normal privilege, or of his right to go about his business as usual.").
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ability to avoid the circumstances giving rise to the altercation, and one that
vehemently rejects such an approach-is correct. This ambiguity reflects
some uncertainty about the underlying principle, reflecting a more modem
perception that one's right to go where one wishes must sometimes be
subordinated to the need to preserve life.
C. Why It Matters: Framing as Outcome-Determinative
Before turning to the law that creates framing ambiguities, it is important
to demonstrate that the choice of fr-ame has concrete and significant
consequences for the outcome of self-defense cases. This is evident from a
New York case, People v. Simmons.49 Martinez, who was drunk, accosted
Simmons.50 Martinez demanded money, Simmons refused, and the men
exchanged words. 5' As the argument escalated into a fight, Simmons
suggested that the two "take it outside," where there was a fistfight, initiated
by Simmons.52 Martinez then began "digging in his pants."153 Simmons
began walking away, but upon seeing that Martinez appeared to be reaching
for a weapon, returned.54 Martinez pulled out his gun, and the two began
struggling for it.55 Martinez began firing and shot Simmons; ultimately
Simmons gained control of the weapon and shot Martinez, killing him.56
Simmons was convicted of manslaughter; the prosecutor's theory was that
"the defendant could be considered criminally liable for murder because he
failed to 'walk away' at the time of his initial confrontation with the decedent
in the lobby."157 The appellate court reversed; in its view, the trial court
should have made clear that the critical time frame in which to assess the
defendant's behavior was the point at which "the defendant actually exerted
deadly physical force against the decedent.... 1"58 This narrowly drawn
frame was, in the court's view, the appropriate one; "[ult was . . . irrelevant
49 615 N.Y.S.2d 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
50 Id at 57.
51 Id
52 Id. at 57-58.
53 Id at 58.
54Id
55 Simmons, 65 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
5 6 Id
57Id In closing argument, "the prosecutor argued, '[he] followed the deceased out.
He provoked this fight. He went after [the decedent]. He didn't walk away when he could
have. This isn't self-defense."' Id
5 8 Id.
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that the defendant might have been able to walk away at the time of the
initial encounter. . . .5
How we draw the frame, then, can definitively determine whether an
actor may claim self-defense. The next question is whether there is a clear
advantage to one party or the other in drawing the frame narrowly or broadly.
Some have argued that there is a distinct directional bias in the choice of
frame. Prof. Jody Armour has argued, for example, that defendants favor a
broad frame that enables the factfinder to consider the narrative context of
the alleged crime, while the state favors "a narrow time frame that excludes
evidence about events leading up to the criminal incident."60 He argues that
review of context and an expanded frame invariably leads to a more
sympathetic view of the defendant. 6 ' This might be true in some categories
of cases; in particular, in assessing claims of self-defense made by victims of
domestic violence, expanding the frame might provide a more sympathetic
and more nuanced understanding of the defendant's actions. As the next
section will show, however, a broad frame can also deny a defendant a self-
defense claim. The inevitable conclusion is that the framing issue is
malleable and manipulable in the service of differing interests.
D. Inviting the Expanded Frame: Necessity and Other Ambiguities
As Section III.B demonstrated, caselaw and contemporary authorities
have suggested that there is no framing problem in the context of self-
defense. This is inaccurate. Even the early caselaw was more ambiguous than
the contemporary analysis suggests. Language requiring one claiming self-
defense to "employ[] all means in his power ... to avoid the danger and avert
the necessity of taking life" left the matter unclear.62 Such ambiguity has
59 Id. at 59.
60 Jody Armour, Just Deserts: Narrative, Perspective, Choice, and Blame, 57 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 525, 526 (1995-96).
61 Id at 526-57.
62 See, e.g., State v. Schroeder, 176 P. 659, 660 (Kan. 1918) ("The testimony offered
by the defendant shows that he was not seeking to avoid danger or to do everything in his
power to avert the necessity of shooting, as was his duty under the law."); People v.
Kennedy, 54 N.E. 51, 52 (N.Y. 1899) ("[W]hen one believes himself about to be attacked
by another, and to receive great bodily injury, it is his duty to avoid the attack, if in his
power to do so, and the right of attack for the purpose of self-defense does not arise until
he has done everything in his power to avoid its necessity."); Lee v. State, 9 So. 407,
407-08 (Ala. 1891) ("[fln order to entitle a person to the benefits of the plea of self-
defense against the charge of homicide, he must have employed all means in his power,
consistent with his safety, to avoid the danger and avert the necessity of taking
life . .. ."); Wailer v. State, 8 So. 153, 155 (Ala. 1890) ("Defendant cannot contribute to
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persisted and developed further in contemporary law. One vehicle injecting
such ambiguity is the requirement of "necessity."
Self-defense purports to be grounded on necessity. In theory, that means
that nothing short of the necessity to exercise the use of force will justify it; if
we are talking about lethal force, that means the necessity for the taking of
life. Courts hesitant to sanction the taking of life as justified have sometimes
interpreted the concept of necessity more expansively to preclude the
claim.63
To begin with, it should be said that the notion that necessity drives self-
defense is overly simplistic. Even in the paradigmatic case of lethal self-
defense-in which an entirely innocent actor is confronted by an aggressor
threatening imminent deadly force-the use of deadly force may be
inevitable, but it is not, strictly speaking, necessary.64 Even leaving aside the
idea that a threat to one's life might not create the necessity to take the life of
another, necessity is not universally required in the application of self-
defense doctrine. As numerous authors have noted, the theoretical
underpinning of the law of self-defense is by no means consistent or
unilateral. 65 While some components of the doctrine of lethal self-defense are
premised on the notion that life must be preserved at all costs,6 6 deemed the
bringing on the difficulty, and voluntarily and unnecessarily placing himself in a situation
of danger excuse killing his adversary on the right of self-defense.").
63 See Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("[Blefore a person
can avail himself of the plea of self-defense against the charge of homicide, he must do
everything in his power, consistent with his safety, to avoid the danger and avoid the
necessity of taking life.").
64 The inevitability of self-defense does not make it necessary, but it explains why
we might choose not to punish it. As Prof. George Fletcher points out, we view the use of
lethal force in response to a threat of death as permissible not because it is necessary, but
because it is involuntary. Because most actors whose lives were threatened would save
their own lives at the expense of their adversary's lives, we treat this conduct as
privileged as a "way of making the moral claim that he is not to be blamed for the kind of
choice that other people would make under the same circumstances." GEORGE FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.5.1 (1978); see also Boaz Sangero, A New Defense for
Self-Defense, 9 BuFF. CasIv. L. REv. 475, 501 (2005-06) ("Although the... actor does
have an (objective) choice of alternative behavior, her freedom of choice is nonetheless
restricted. In the difficult situation in which the actor finds herself, the survival instinct is
very powerful. This is human nature.").
65 See Nourse, supra note 47, at 1273 (arguing that "the law' s necessity is not
always as 'necessary' as it may seem, if by necessary we mean that the defendant must
choose the 'least violent' or 'most pacifist' alternative").
66 Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-
Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 653, 676 (2003).
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'4pacifist" view67 by one scholar and a type of "lesser evils" approach by
another,68 others do not require a singleminded focus on the saving of lives.69
Self-defense law, derived as it is from an amalgam of theoretical
perspectives, privileges necessity in some aspects but not in all.
Imminence, for example, is a product of the necessity requirement.70
Most jurisdictions require a person claiming self-defense to demonstrate that
he or she faced an imminent threat of unlawful force.7' In theory, a person
who faces a non-imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury does not
need to act in self-defense. First, it is possible that the threat -may never come
to pass; a mere threat of future violence may not be acted upon, and therefore
does not create a genuine necessity.7 2 Second, even if the future threat is
certain, the actor may have access to other solutions besides retaliatory
violence, making a resort to self-defense unnecessary.73 The doctrine of
proportionality can also be understood as driven by necessity.74
At the same time, the rejection of the retreat requirement in a majority of
American jurisdictions 75 and the adoption of the castle doctrine even where
the law would otherwise require retreat reflect a focus on other concerns
besides necessity. If the need to preserve life were the exclusive justification
for self-defense doctrine, retreat would always be required. Someone who
67 This is Prof. Nourse's terminology. See Nourse, supra note 47, at 1271-72. "The
pacifist stresses a view of necessity that depends upon the need for the defendant to avoid
violence." Id. Prof. Nourse describes the pacifist position as "almost orthodoxy." Id at
1272.
68 This is Prof. Fletcher's view. See FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 10.5.2.
69 Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law,
64 CAL. L. REv. 871, 879 (1976) (preservation of life principle is systematically
contradicted by the criminal law).
70 Prof. Richard Rosen deems imminence a "'.translator"'. of the necessity principle:
it is required "because, and only because, of the fear that without imminence there is no
assurance that the defensive action is necessary to avoid the harm." Richard A. Rosen,
On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv. 3 71,
380 (1993).
71 For a detailed discussion of the confused way in which the concept of imminence
is applied in self-defense cases, see Nourse, supra note 47.
72 See 2 PAuL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES, § 13 1 (c), at 77 (1984) ("The
actor should not be permitted to use force when such force would be equally as effective
at a later time and the actor suffers no harm or risk by waiting.").
73 See Nourse, supra note 47, at 1276-77. As Prof. Nourse discusses, this analysis
can convert the question of temporal imminence into a problem of the avoidability of the
threat, which implicates other aspects of self-defense law, including the requirement (or
not) of retreat.
74 See PAuL H. ROBINSON, CRPiNAL LAW §§ 8.1, 8.4 (1997).
75 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 10.4(f).
302 Vol. 71:2
2010] LOOKING FOR TROUBLE30
could, with complete safety, avoid the need to resort to lethal force by
running away from the threat has no real "need" to use that force.76
Necessity-or more correctly, its absence-is routinely articulated as the
theoretical basis for the retreat rule.
The requirement of retreat is not by any means universally recognized,
however. American jurisdictions have been divided as to whether retreat is
required.77 In the American West, the principle of retreat was soundly
rejected; 78 it seemed to require an unmanly obligation to flee a physical
confrontation 79 and to exacerbate the threat posed by a threatened assailant,
who might be more likely to threaten unlawful force if the law required his
victims to flee from him rather than confront him.80 One Oklahoma court,
rejecting an instruction which required the defendant to "employ all
76 DRESSLER, supra note 23, § 18.02[C][21 ("If a person can safely retreat and,
therefore, avoid killing the aggressor, deadly force is, objectively speaking,
unnecessary."); see also Carpenter, supra note 66, at 694 ("At its core, the obligation to
retreat is no more than a shorthand way to underscore the importance of necessity in the
use of deadly force.").
77 Carpenter, supra note 66, at 655.
78 See David W. Collins, The Duty to Retreat, 3 GRIM. JUST. Q. 80, 82 (1975)
("[W]ith westward expansion a dichotomy began to appear. Some states continued to
require a person exposed to an unprovoked, deadly assault to retreat, while others, chiefly
the western and southern states, did not require retreat.").
79 See Carpenter, supra note 66, at 655 n.6 (referring to the refusal to require retreat
as the "true man" doctrine); see also State v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tenm. 1995).
As one author suggested,
the American traditions of vigilantism, the competitive spirit, and especially the
idea that it is cowardly to retreat, which are continually broadcast and
reinforced by the mass media, can only lead to a conditioned response on the
part of a victim meeting, 'at the moment of truth,' a felonious assault. In view
of this conditioning, it appears both unrealistic and unreasonable to continue to
require a duty to retreat by one exposed to a felonious attack.
Collins, supra note 78, at 88 (footnote omitted); see also Dan Kahan, The Secret
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L. REV. 413, 433 (1999) ("[iT]he dispute over the
'true man' doctrine was about whose minds-those of the aristocratic South and the
ruggedly individualistic West, on the one hand, or those of the more egalitarian and
cosmopolitan East, on the other-would be proclaimed genuinely 'American' by the
law.").
80 See, e.g., Philips v. Commonwealth, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 328, 331 (1865):
[Riunning once may induce the assailant to believe that the assailed will never stand
and manfully defend himself, and thus embolden him to renew his attacks without
apprehension of mny resistance perilous to himself. If the party once assailed by an
enemy who had threatened to kill him is bound by law to run if he can thereby
escape that assault, legal self-defense may become a mockery and the sacred right
itself a shadow.
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reasonable means within his power, consistent with his safety, to avoid the
danger and avert the necessity of the killing,"8' wrote:
This practically placed the burden upon the appellant of proving his
innocence ... . Under the old common law, no man could defend himself
until he had retreated, and until his back was to the wall; but this is not the
law in free America. Here the wall is to every man's back. It is the wall of
his rights; and when he is at a place where he has a right to be, and he is
unlawfully assailed, he may stand and defend himself.82
Although the Model Penal Code attempted to impose a requirement of
retreat, such a requirement is still a minority rule in American criminal law.8 3
Even where it applies, the retreat requirement has its limitations. First,
there are places-most often the home, under the so-called "castle
doctrine"7-where the threatened actor is not obliged to retreat.84 Moreover,
the requirement of retreat is ordinarily limited to situations in which retreat
can be effected without risk to the actor; this condition of perfect safety
radically limits the application of the retreat requirement, particularly in the
context of modem weaponry.85 We might expect a theory of self-defense
premised on the importance of saving lives at all costs to be considerably
81 Fowler v. State, 126 P. 831, 833 (Okla. Grim. App. 1912).
8 2 Id.
83 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b); LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 10.4(f). The attempt
to bring in retreat through a more generalized inquiry into the "reasonableness" of the
actor's conduct is discussed infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
84 The problems this creates when both actors are residents of the home, and the
implications for self-defense claims asserted by battered spouses, are discussed in
Carpenter, supra note 66. The Model Penal Code accepts this limitation on the duty to
retreat. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(2).
85 The Model Penal Code requires retreat only where "the actor knows that he can
avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii). A person faced with a threat of gunfire can rarely avoid the
situation with complete safety simply by retreating. See Laney v. United States, 294 F.
412, 414-15 (D.C. Cir. 1923):
[Tjhbe common-law rule, which required the assailed to retreat to the wall, had its
origin before the general introduction of firearms. If a person is threatened with
death or great bodily harm by an assailant, armed with a modem rifle, in open space,
away from safety, it would be ridiculous to require him to retreat. Indeed, to retreat
would be to invite almost certain death.
The Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that the retreat doctrine did not make any
sense when dealing with firearms. See State v. Gardner, 104 N.W. 971, 975 (Minn.
1905).
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more vigorous in its enforcement of a retreat requirement--or perhaps to
have a different and more inclusive view of necessity.8 6
Other evidence that necessity is not the sole driving theory behind self-
defense doctrine is provided by statutes that permit lethal force to be used to
resist or oppose the commission of certain categories of forcible felony.87
While avoiding a forcible felony is important, it is not inevitably the case that
every instance of a forcible felony poses the kind of risk to the life of the
actor that necessity would require. 88 Permitting the use of lethal force to
prevent the crime-effectively using the threatened felony as a proxy for
grave danger to the actor-will include in the scope of lawful use of lethal
force in self-defense some situations in which there is no necessity for the
taking of life.89
86 See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 47, at 127 1:
Those theorists, like George Fletcher, who urge that an imminence requirement is
essential to a justified self-defense claim, do so based on a theory of self-defense
that is heavily invested with pacifism and social responsibility toward the victim's
interest in life. The idea is that a defendant's act is justified when necessary, where
necessity means that the defendant had 'no' alternative but to kill. But this is not the
only available view of necessity. Theories of self-defense that focus on autonomy do
so on the basis that '(r)ight need never yield to wrong.' The argument is that the
killing is 'necessary' when it serves to right the wrong of a deadly attack.
87 For example, the New York Penal Law permits an actor to use deadly force
against another person if "[h]e or she reasonably believes that such other person is
committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual
act or robbery." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35. 15(2)(b) (McKinney 2004). In the notorious
Bernhard Goetz case, the self-defense claim was premised not on an imminent threat of
the use of lethal force, but on a claim that Goetz believed that he was facing an attempted
robbery. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE 22 (1988). As Prof. Fletcher
notes, this rule-permitting the use of deadly force in response to a threat of robbery-is
,'more favorable than many states to claims of self-defense." Id Other states with
provisions explicitly enumerating the felonies that may be resisted with lethal force
include Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704(2) (West 2009), and Nebraska,
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1409(4) (2009). Some jurisdictions have statutes providing that
deadly force is justifiable to prevent the commission of a felony, but judicial
interpretations of that language have limited the use of deadly force to prevention of
dangerous felonies. See, e.g., Mammano v. State, 333 P.2d 602, 605 (Okla. Grim. App.
1958); State v. Nyland, 287 P.2d 345, 347 (Wash. 1955) (holding prevention of the
felony of adultery did not justify homicide).
88 Kadish, supra note 69, at 888. Prof. Paul Robinson suggests that under such a
provision, a technical violation of a kidnapping statute-carrying a bus passenger past his
stop, for example-might justify the use of lethal force, even in a situation in which there
was no risk to life. ROBINSON, supra note 72, at 83-84.
89 One author has proposed that battered spouse self-defense might in some
circumstances be recast as claims of defense against kidnapping, to avoid some of the
problems inherent in those cases. See Gregory A. Diamond, To Have But Not to Hold:
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Even if we accept the proposition that necessity governs the applicability
of self-defense law, however, the framing problem remains. If the frame is
drawn to include the defendant's own prior conduct and, on that basis, the
ultimate use of force is deemed unnecessary, self-defense is unavailable. A
frame drawn broadly to include a range of prior choices that should, in
retrospect, have been made differently may result in the conclusion that the
ultimate use of force was unnecessary and therefore unjustified. The frame in
which we assess "necessity" is therefore critically important.
The facts of Laney v. United States"0 provide a powerful example of the
framing problem. In July of 1919, William Laney, a black man, was on the
street in Washington, D.C. when he was pursued by a large and violent white
mob shouting racist epithets and threats.91 Laney, fearful for his life, pulled
out a gun, which caused the mob to disperse, and ducked into an alley.92
Some time later, believing that the danger was past, he returned to the street,
hoping to go to work.93 The mob resumed its pursuit of Laney, 94 and fired at
him. He returned fire and shot and killed Kenneth Crall. 95
At his manslaughter trial, Laney claimed self-defense. The appellate
court, however, ruled that as a matter of law, he was not entitled to a self-
defense instruction because he could not demonstrate the necessity for the
taking of human life.96 Laney certainly faced an imminent threat of death at
the time he resorted to lethal force. In the court's view, however, it was
required to look to preceding events to assess necessity. Because Laney
stepped into the street and placed himself in the position where he would be
threatened by the mob when he could have avoided it, he was responsible for
creating the confrontation. 97 Since Laney's own choices played a role in the
events that led up to his use of lethal force, the court deemed its use
Can 'Resistance Against Kidnapping " Justify Lethal Self-Defense Against Incapacitated
Batterers?, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 729, 733 (2002).
90 294 F. 412, 413-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
91 Id. at 413.
92 Id.
93 Id.
941Id. In his words, "While I was in the areaway between 617 and 619, the mob
came across from the south side of the street, firing and hollering 'Let's kill the
[epithet]! "' Id
95 Laney, 294 F. at 413.
96 Laney objected to the self-defense instructions given at his trial. The appellate
court concluded that because he was not entitled to claim self-defense at all, he was not
prejudiced by the instructions given. Id.
97 In the court's view, Laney, having arrived at a "place of comparative safety"--the
alleyway in which he had concealed himself-should not have returned to the street. Id.
at 414.
306 Vol. 71:2
2010] LOOKING FOR TROUBLE30
unnecessary and therefore unjustified. 98 The court's view of necessity
reached back in time, requiring Laney to do "everything in his power,
consistent with his safety, to avoid the danger and avoid the necessity of
taking life."99 If he could have avoided the attack, he was obliged to do so, at
risk of losing the claim of necessity and the concomitant right of self-
defense. 100
Laney is an old case laden with racist views of autonomy, dignity and
privilege. Yet its vision of necessity-and the broad frame that it implies for
an analysis of a self-defense claim-persists. Jury instructions in the District
of Columbia, based on the principles articulated in Laney, remain viable
today.' 01  One instruction provides: "one who deliberately puts
himself/herself in a position where s/he has reason to believe that his/her
presence will provoke trouble cannot claim self-defense."'102 Nor is this
approach limited to a lone jurisdiction. Other states permit the factfinder to
consider the broad frame in which an encounter arose in assessing a claim of
98 Id at 414:
Hence, when he adjusted his gun and stepped out into the areaway, he had every
reason to believe that his presence there would provoke trouble. We think his
conduct in adjusting his revolver and going into the areaway was such as to deprive
him of any right to invoke the plea of self-defense.
See also Moore v. State, 160 S.W. 206 (Ark. 1913). Moore was accused of murdering her
husband, who she claimed assaulted her with a knife when she went, armed, to find him
at a house of ill repute. Moore argued that the jury should have been instructed that she
"had a legal right to go to the home where she believed they were staying and to carry
with her a weapon to defend herself." The court rejected that claim, finding that "it
permits one who is expecting trouble, and probably looking for it, to be armed and ready
for it when it comes."
99 Laney, 294 F. at 414.
100 "If one has reason to believe that he will be attacked, in a manner which
threatens him with bodily injury, he must avoid the attack if it is possible to do so, and
the right of self-defense does not arise until he has done everything in his power to
prevent its necessity." Id
10 1 Until 1993, the language of a pattern jury instruction in the District of Columbia
was taken almost verbatim from Laney. See D.C. PAr-rERN JURY INSTRUCTION § 5.16(B)
("Before a person can avail himself of the plea of self-defense against a charge of
homicide, he must do everything in his power, consistent with his own safety, to avoid
the danger and avoid the necessity of taking life."). This language was omitted in 1993
because of concern that it implied a duty to retreat. Practice Commentary to D.C.
PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTION § 5.15.
102 1-1I CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE D.C. Foam INSTRUCTION § 5.16(B)
(2007). The commentary following the instruction expressly cites Laney for the
proposition that "self-defense is not available to a defendant who deliberately puts
himself in a position where he has reason to believe that his presence will provoke
trouble, even if his purpose in putting himself in that position was benign." Id
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self-defense, and ask whether the defensive actor should have done
something different, earlier in the encounter, that could have avoided the
need to use lethal force.
This approach is evident in jury instructions on self-defense. A review of
these instructions indicates that they suggest to factfinders, in a variety of
broad formulations, that the defendant claiming the lawful use of force must
not have played a role in creating the circumstances giving rise to the need to
use that force. The instructions do little to define the parameters of that
constraint, inviting factfinders to expand the frame to consider significant
expanses of prior conduct, and to deny the actor a claim of self-defense on
that basis.
1. "Without Fault, " and Other Vague Framing Formulations
Jury instructions in self-defense cases often contain broad language
about the actor's obligation to avoid the situation, susceptible of an
interpretation that broadens the frame of the inquiry. While at least some of
these instructions appear to be intended to preclude the initial aggressor from
claiming self-defense, they are phrased more broadly than that and are not
limited to that context. Instead, they are typically expressed in brief and
vague language that opens the door to the framing issue.
Many instructions suggest that a defendant who played some role in
creating the situation that led to the use of force cannot rely on self-defense.
One such formulation requires that the actor claiming self-defense not be "at
fault." Ohio's instruction, for example, requires a defendant claiming self-
defense to prove that "he/she was not at fault in creating the situation giving
rise to" the event in which death or injury occurred. 103 Virginia's instruction
requires that the defendant be "without fault" in bringing on the violent
encounter.' 04 The notion of being "free from fault" is mirrored in treatises,
which state a similar requirement. 105 While Prof. Dressler terms the
103 4 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 411.31(2) (2006); see also 4 Offlo JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 411.3 1(3)(A) (2006).
104 VIRGINL4 MODEL JURY INsTRUCTIoNs-CRim. No. 52.500 (requiring a conclusion
"that the defendant was without fault in provoking or bringing on the [... difficulty]").
The subsequent instruction, 52.510, provides ways that a defendant "to some degree at
fault" is able to reclaim the privilege. See also the commentary following MD. CRimv.
PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 5:07 (2006), which states that self-defense "requires a
faultless victim." AmJur states the general principle granting the privilege of self-defense
to "one who, free from fault in bringing on a difficulty, is attacked..."40 Am. JuR. 2D
Homicide § 163 (2008).
105 See, e.g., PERKINs & BOYCE, supra note 48, at 1115 ("One who is himself free
from fault is privileged to use force in the effort to defend himself against personal harm
threatened by the unlawful act of another.."(footnote omitted)).
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requirement of being "free from fault in the difficulty" "~an
overstatement,"' 0 6 it is a common formulation in a jury instruction. 107
There are also formulations in which a defendant responsible for
"trouble" or "difficulty" is deprived of a self-defense claim. The District of
Columbia instruction provides, "One who deliberately puts himself/herself in
a position where s/he has reason to believe that his/her presence will provoke
trouble cannot claim self-defense."' 08 Louisiana precludes one who "brings
on a difficulty" from claiming self-defense "unless he withdraws from the
conflict";' 09 the phrase "brings on a difficulty" is not defined. Minnesota's
instruction provides that "[ilf the defendant began or induced the incident
that led to the necessity of using force in the defendant's own defense," the
defendant must decline an assault, try to escape, and inform the adversary of
a desire for peace before he can resort to self-defense. 110 A Massachusetts
instruction requires a person claiming self-defense to "avail[] himself or
herself of all proper means to avoid physical combat."11'
Framing issues are also presented by an instruction like, "[a]s part and
parcel of the 'necessity' requirement that inheres in every claim of lawful
self-defense, evidence that a defendant could have safely avoided using
106 See DRESSLER, supra note 23, § 18.02; see also Rosen, supra note 70, at 396
("society does not now, nor has it ever," required individuals to go to great lengths to flee
from unlawful threats).
No matter how clear it was to Gary Cooper that somebody would end up dead if he
did not leave before the train carrying his enemy arrived at 'High Noon,' our culture
allows him to stay in town and affords him the right to kill in self-defense when the
bad guys come after him.
Id (footnote omitted).
107 DRESSLER, supra note 23, § 18.02:
For example, if D calls V, an acquaintance, 'a jerk,' to which V take[s] such
umbrage that he pulls out a gun and menaces D with it, D is justified in killing V
(assuming that the other requirements of the defense are met), although D was not
entirely free from fault in the conflict.
108 1_ GRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR DC FORm INSTRUCTION § 5.16 (2007). This
instruction is derived from the language of Laney. The instructions provide that this part
should be given "[w]here some evidence is introduced that the defendant might have
been the attacker," but nothing in the instruction restricts the factfmnder's consideration of
this broad language to that circumstance. Id.
109 LA. CRIIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURE § 6.33 (2d. ed. 2009-10).
1 10 MINN. JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES-GCRIM. § 7.07 (5th ed. 2009). The section is
captioned "Self-Defense-Revival of Aggressor's Right of Self-Defense," but it is not
clear that the captions are read to the jury, and the language "began or induced the
incident" could be understood to encompass much more than being the initial aggressor
in a violent encounter.
11 MASS. SUP~ER. GT. GRIM. PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Vol. II, § 3.6.
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deadly force is normally relevant in determining whether it was reasonably
necessary for him to kill . *".1 12 The instruction does not advise the
factfinder as to when the obligation of safe avoidance arises, opening the
door to a broad and variable conception of the frame in which to assess
whether the defendant met the obligation to avoid the encounter. Such
language has been interpreted to suggest that the actor had an obligation to
avoid not just aggression, but any earlier acts that played a role in creating
the need for self-defense.'" 3
If the purpose of these instructions is to prevent a defendant who is the
initial aggressor or a participant in a mutual affray from claiming self-
defense, there are clearer ways of saying so. New Mexico's uniform jury
instruction, for example, provides that "Self-defense is not available to the
defendant if he [started the fight or agreed to fight].""14 Most instructions,
however, do not limit the factfinder's consideration of the situation in this
way. 115
112 People v. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d 30,46 (Mich. 2002).
113 See Goins v. State, 21 N.E. 476,481 (Ohio 1889), discussed infra note 161.
114 N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCIONs-GRM. § 14-5190 (2009). The instruction then
sets out those circumstances where an initial aggressor or participant in a mutual affray
can regain the right of self-defense. Id; see also PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIM. JURY
INSTRUCTioNS, § 9.501 (2d. ed. 2005) (providing that a defendant is not justified if "the
defendant provoked the use of force against [him] [her] by engaging in conduct that
showed that [he] [she] intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to the alleged
Victim."); WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTioNS § 16.04 (3d. ed. 2008) (providing
that if the jury finds "that the defendant was the aggressor, and that defendant's acts and
conduct provoked or commenced the fight, then self-defense .. , is not available as a
defense.").
115 Another alternative would be to limit the restriction on self-defense to one who
brings on the difficulty by virtue of a wrongful act. See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth,
216 S.W. 607, 608 (Ky. 1919) (limiting right of self defense to "one who brings on the
difficulty by his own wrongfuil act"); see also Hall v. Commonwealth, 270 S.W. 35, 38
(Ky. 1925) ("Any wrongful or unlawful act of accused, which is reasonably calculated to
an affray or deadly conflict, and which provokes the difficulty, is such aggression or
provocation as deprives him of the right of self-defense."). This would still permit the
expansion of the fr-ame if the accused's conduct were a violation of law. See, e.g., State v.
Corchado, 453 A.2d 427, 429 n.4 (Conn. 1982) (state's requested instruction provided
that "any act of the accused in violation of law and reasonably calculated to produce the
occasion amounts to bringing on the difficulty and bars his right to assert self-defense as
a justification or excuse for a homicide"); People v. Newcomer, 50 P. 405, 407 (Ca.
1897) (upholding instruction that a "cause which originates in the
party. . . himself,.. .. in a danger which he has voluntarily brought upon himself by his
own misconduct and lawlessness" cannot support a self-defense claim).
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2. Applying the Formulations in the Real World of Caselaw
How do the courts reconcile these statements of the law with the
principle that self-defense law does not require an expansion of the frame?
As one might expect, inconsistently. In some cases, the defendant is denied a
self-defense claim because his earlier actions placed him in a situation he
might have avoided had he made better decisions. Consider Commonwealth
v. Jones," 6 a Pennsylvania case. Jones went to the home of his common law
wife's son to pick up some belongings."17 Jones and the son got into a fight;
Jones departed, but later learned from his common law wife that the son and
several others were driving to his house."18 Jones asked her to call the police,
then dressed, armed himself with a kitchen knife, "and left the premises to
await the arrival of the carload of hostile youths.""19 After "La] flare, some
stones, and a piece of a bicycle were thrown at the house," Jones went to
confront the youths and struck one of them.' 20 The youth, in turn, pushed
Jones to the ground; Jones slashed at the young man with a knife and injured
him severely.'12' Jones was charged with aggravated assault and convicted in
a bench trial; he claimed that he should have been acquitted on the ground of
self-defense.'122 The court rejected this claim because Jones became involved
in a confrontation he could have avoided.' 23 It first held that, to claim self-
defense, the defendant must "have been free from fault in provoking or
continuing the difficulty which resulted in the [injury]."'124 Jones, by leaving
his home to confront the youths, was "'.continuing the difficulty"' and
therefore could not claim self-defense. Because the police had already been
called, it was not "immediately necessary" for Jones to use force to protect
himself.'2 5 "[Bly coming onto the porch when the action was not reasonably
necessary, appellant was 'continuing the difficulty' that resulted in the
assault."12 6
116 332 A.2d 464, 465 (Pa. 1974).
117 Id
118 Id
"19 Id.
120 Id
121 Id.
'22 Jones, 332 A.2d at 465.
13I.at 466.
124 Id
125 Id
126Id The court also held, in an alternative holding, that Jones resorted to
disproportionate and therefore excessive force. Id. at 467.
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By contrast, in State v. Corchado,127 the court held that instructions that
permitted the jury to consider an expanded frame were reversible error. In
Corchado, the defendant went to his girlfriend's house and saw a car
belonging to the victim, Ventura, parked outside. 128 Corchado confronted
Ventura and asked if he was "fooling around" with the girlfriend. Ventura
responded by drawing a gun; Corchado fled and reentered the girlfriend's
house.'129 Half an hour later, believing that Ventura was gone, Corchado went
out on the street. When he saw Ventura there, he approached him and asked
him again if he was "fooling around" with the girlfriend. When Ventura
responded with a "mean smile," Corchado slapped him. Ventura pulled out
his gun again; believing that he was going to be shot, Corchado shot and
killed Ventura.' 30 The appellate court held that an instruction that required
Corchado to be without fault entitled him to a new trial:
We believe that the words "without fault".. .. erroneously deprived the
defendant of the fair intendment of [the statute]. The term "without fault"
was neither explained nor defined. The statute does not provide that a
person be "without fault" to come within its reach. It is not difficult to
visualize self-defense situations where, as here, there is some fault on both
sides. 13 1
The court seemed particularly concerned that the defendant's slapping
the victim might have led the jury to believe that it could not find that he
acted in self-defense:
Much is made of the slap given the victim by the defendant just before
the fatal shooting, after the former had made a "mean smile." The slap, of
course, is to be viewed not only as a response to the "mean smile" but also
in light of the earlier altercation in which the victim had pointed a gun at the
then unarmed defendant after the defendant had accused him of "fooling
around" with Bosco. Thus, to a layman on a jury, there was some "fault" on
both sides. Yet "without fault," open ended as it was in context, propounded
an absolute for the jury while the statute does not. 132
Other prior conduct that is viewed as having created the situation is
sometimes viewed as sufficient to deprive the defendant of a claim of self-
defense. In State v. Robinson, for example, Robinson was participating in
127 453 A.2d 427 (Conn. 1982).
128 Id. at 428.
129 Id
10I.at 428-29.
13' Id at 432-33.
12I.at 433.
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selling cocaine out of an apartment.' 33 Several men came, armed with guns,
to rob the apartment; one fired several shots into the apartment.' 34 Robinson,
hiding behind a closed door, fired his gun in response and killed another
person involved in the drug-selling enterprise.' 35 He was convicted of
murder and argued that the jury should have been instructed on transferred
intent self-defense.'136 The court rejected his claim on the ground that
Robinson, by participating in the cocaine sales, "was at fault in creating the
situation that led to the affray."137 Because he "intentionally assumed a
primary role in the criminal enterprise that was operating out of the
residence" and acquired a firearm to protect the enterprise, he was to blame
for what happened.' 38 "Although the evidence indicated that intruders did in
fact enter the residence and that Robinson was therefore not solely at fault in
the events that led to the affray, his fault was such that he should not have
been given the benefit of the self-defense instruction." 13 9
Far from the clarity envisioned by contemporary commentators, jury
instructions on necessity in the context of self-defense create the opportunity
for factfinders to expand or contract the frame in a way that deprives an actor
of an otherwise viable claim of self-defense for playing a role in creating the
situation that gave rise to the need for self-defense in the first place.
Another area that creates ambiguity about the appropriate scope of the
frame is the notion that the factfinder ought to make a generalized inquiry
into the "reasonableness" of the defendant's conduct. One situation in which
this problem arises is when the prosecution has suggested that the defendant
had the opportunity to retreat, but the jurisdiction does not require retreat. 140
The court may respond that the issue was nonetheless appropriate for the
factfinder to consider in assessing the "reasonableness" of the defendant's
behavior.'14 1 The defendant's failure to retreat-even in a jurisdiction with a
13 726 N.E.2d 581, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
134 Id
"35 Id.
16I.at 585.
13 7 Id.
138 Id
139 Robinson, 726 N.E.2d at 585. The court also held in the more convincing
alternative that Robinson did not offer sufficient evidence to indicate that he reasonably
believed he faced an imminent danger of death, since he fired through a closed door
without figuring out who was outside or whether he was at risk. Id. at 585-86.
14 0 See, e.g., Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79, 93 (Okla. Grim. App. 1994) ("While we do
not overrule our earlier holdings that a party has no duty to retreat from a confrontation,
we believe the possibility of escape should be a recognized factor in determining whether
deadly force was necessary to avoid death or great bodily harm.").
141' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 380 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Mass. 1978):
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no-retreat rule-is deemed relevant to whether he acted "reasonably" in
using lethal force. That opens the frame to consideration of the defendant's
broader choices.'14 2
The District of Columbia's current approach to self-defense is similar.
Termed the "middle ground," it "imposes no duty to retreat, but it 'permit[s]
the jury to consider whether a defendant, if he safely could have avoided
further encounter by stepping back or walking away, was actually or
The judge did charge the jurors to consider all the conditions existing at the time and
place of the shooting in deciding (a) whether the defendant "had reasonable grounds
to believe and actually did believe that he was in inmninent danger of death or
serious bodily hrm... from which danger he could save himself only by using
deadly force against his assailant," (b) whether "he, the defendant, had availed
himself of all proper means to avoid physical contact before resorting himself to
defense by the use of a deadly force or a deadly weapon," and (c) whether the force
used by the defendant was reasonable or was excessive in all the circumstances of
this case. The court held this a correct statement of the law.
See also Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) ("Rationally the failure to
retreat is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in order to determine
whether the defendant went farther than he was justified in doing."). But see LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:19(D) (2007) ("No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the
possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used force
or violence in defense of his person or property had a reasonable belief that force or
violence was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent a forcible offense or to
prevent the unlawful entry.").
142 See, e.g., State v. Reimer, 912 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tenn. 1995). Renner came to
his former girlfriend's home to visit their son. The victim, Shuttles, was the girlfriend's
new boyfriend; he was at the apartment when Renner arrived. Renner argued with
Shuttles, and tried to convince his former girlfriend to resume their relationship and to
end her relationship with Shuttles. Renner then went into the kitchen; he claimed to hear
Shuttles load a firearm in the living room. Fearing for his safety, Renner pulled out a
firearm and decided to leave, passing through the living room-where the front door
was-to leave the apartment. Renner contended that Shuttles threatened to kill him, and
that he responded with gunfire; Renner killed Shuttles. At trial, the prosecutor asked
Renner if he could have left the apartment from the kitchen, rather than going through the
living room, and raised this issue again in closing argument, suggesting that "it afforded
Renner a way out, which, if taken, would have permitted him to avoid a confrontation
with Shuttles in the living room." State law did not require retreat, and Renner contended
that the prosecutor's arguments suggested to the jury that retreat was required. The
appellate court rejected the argument. Although retreat was not required, the question was
nonetheless relevant, the court held, to the jury's analysis of, inter alia, "the
circumstances under which the confrontation occurred" and "whether Renner's conduct
under the circumstances was reasonable." Id. at 704; see also Gant v. United States, 83
A.2d 439 (D.C. 1951); State v. Morgan, No. 03C01-9408-CR-00305, 1997 WL 110022
(Tenn. Grim. App. Mar. 13, 1997).
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apparently in imminent danger of bodily harm."",43 This approach has been
accepted in other jurisdictions as well.'44 Even outside the context of retreat,
the reasonableness inquiry can take into account actions that preceded the
ultimate violent encounter, asking the trier of fact to consider "all" the
circumstances, broadly defined. One court approved an instruction which
provided, "[ilis the totality of everything which took place from which you
must decide whether or not the defendant was inviting trouble or whether he
wasn't." 145
This attempt to instruct jurors that retreat is not required, but that
reasonableness might require it anyway seems both to undermine the no-
retreat principle' 46 and to result in utterly incomprehensible guidance to the
factfinder. Consider this instruction given in a Michigan case:
143 Cooper v. United States, 512 A.2d 1002, 1004 (D.C. 1986), quoting Gillis v.
United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979). The court explained that "the instruction
given did not impose a duty to retreat, but allowed a failure to retreat, together with all
the other circumstances, to be considered by the jury in determining whether the case was
truly one of self-defense." 512 A.2d at 1004-05; see also Josey v. United States, 135 F.2d
809, 8 10 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
144see, e.g., United States v. Blevins, 555 F.2d 1236, 1239 (5th Cir. 1977)
(applying federal law and approving an instruction that provided that, while retreat was
not required, "if the defendant could have safely retreated and did not do so, his failure to
retreat is a circumstance which you may consider together with the other circumstances
in the case, in determining whether he went farther in repelling the danger, real or
apparent, than he was justified in doing under the circumstances"); State v. Provoid, 266
A.2d 307, 310 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (upholding charge that provided, in a
nonretreat jurisdiction, "[tihe opportunity to retreat ... is a factual element to be
considered .. , together with all other surrounding circumstances in determining only
such resistance and force as appeared to be necessary under all the circumstances.").
145 Commonwealth v. McComb, 341 A.2d 496, 499 (Pa. 1975). McComb had a
disagreement with the deceased about money. Id at 497. McComb agreed to meet the
deceased at 7 p.m. Id. After several interactions during the day, McComb arrived at the
appointed time, pulled out a gun, and shot and killed the deceased. Id at 498. He objected
to an instruction directing the jury to consider the events of the entire day in deciding
whether McComb was the aggressor in the encounter. Id. The court rejected McComb's
claim that the instruction reproduced in text inappropriately expanded the scope of the
jury's consideration. Id.
To determine the reasonableness of the use of a deadly force, the opportunity to
retreat, the role of the accused in provoking or escalating the difficulty, the trier of
fact is required, not only to evaluate the conduct of the appellant during the final
confrontation but also to view it in light of those circumstances that preceded and
precipitated that final confrontation.
Mc~omb, 341 A.2d at 499.
146 Prof. V.F. Nourse raises a similar concern with regard to the issue of immninence.
See generally Nourse, supra note 47. In her study of cases purporting to deal with
imminence as an element of a claim of self-defense, she notes that in some cases
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By law, a person must avoid using deadly force if he can safely do so. If the
defendant could have safely retreated but did not do so, you can consider
that fact along with all the other circumstances when you decide whether he
went farther in protecting himself than he should have. However, if the
defendant honestly and reasonably believed that it was immediately
necessary to use deadly force to protect himself from an [imminent] threat
of death or serious injury, the law does not require him to retreat. He may
stand his ground and use the amount of force he believes necessary to
protect himself. 147
It is hard to imagine this instruction making any sense at all to the
average juror. More significantly, the invitation to consider "all
the ... circumstances" in determining "whether [the defendant] went farther
in protecting himself than he should have" opens the frame to considering all
of the defendant's prior conduct.' 4 8 The concept of reasonableness as a
"imminence serves as a proxy for 'alternatives"'--that is, the court concludes that there is
no imminent threat because the actor had possible alternative courses of action. Id. at
1267. She further notes that if that is the case,
then imminence may operate as a retreat rule--even in those jurisdictions or
situations that do not require retreat. A court that asks whether the threat was
imminent and means by this question whether the defendant had any better, lawful
choice is demanding the kind of second-guessing of alternatives that no-retreat
jurisdictions do not demand. The jury, told that it need not ask why the defendant
did not go through the kitchen door, is still invited to ask the same question, albeit in
temporal form-did the defendant have the time to go through the kitchen door?
Thus, in the same case, a jury may be told to ignore the fact that the defendant could
have run through the door (no retreat rule) and, at the same time, that they must deny
the defense if he could have run through the door (imminence rule).
Id at 1267-68 (footnotes omitted).
147 People v. Riddle, 649 N.W.2d 30, 36-37 (Mich. 2002). The court concluded that
this instruction provided clear direction to the jury.
14 8 Id.
We reaffirm today that the touchstone of any claim of self-defense, as a justification
for homicide, is necessity. An accused's conduct in failing to retreat, or to otherwise
avoid the intended harm, may in some circumstances .. indicate a lack of
reasonableness or necessity in resorting to deadly force in self-defense. For example,
where a defendant "invites trouble" or meets non-imminent force with deadly force,
his failure to pursue an available, safe avenue of escape might properly be brought
to the attention of the factflnder as a factor in determining whether the defendant
acted in reasonable self-defense.
Id at 39. The court went on: "If it is possible to safely avoid an attack then it is not
necessary, and therefore not permissible, to exercise deadly force against the attacker."
Id at 40.
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critical component of necessity, accordingly, creates the possibility of a
broad framing inquiry.'14 9
E. Framing Consistency and Equity Concerns
A flexible approach to the framing inquiry has its appeal. Difficult issues
of self-defense typically arise in cases involving escalating encounters,
threats and counter-threats, and numerous untaken opportunities to avoid the
ultimate violent engagement.' 50 It is understandable that one might want to
ask a decisionniaker to make a less structured and more justice-oriented
inquiry, one that assesses the reasonableness of the behavior of the actor
claiming self-defense under all the circumstances, and creates the potential-
though not the obligation-to open the frame to a broad consideration of all
the events leading up to the ultimate, lethal encounter. 151 The temptation to
149 Commonwealth v. Camp, 330 A.2d 844 (Pa. 1975). Camp, a postal worker, was
approached several times by the victim, who demanded that defendant turn over the
checks he was delivering. Id at 845. Defendant agreed to meet the decedent at a bar. Id
He went there with a weapon; when he thought he saw the victim reach for a gun, he
fired, killing the decedent. Id The court rejected defendant's claim of self-defense,
concluding that, "the appellant, rather than being free from fault in provoking or
continuing the difficulty which resulted in the killing, was directly responsible for its
occurrence." Id. at 846. The court followed that analysis with the conclusion, "[alppellant
went to the bar armed and looking for the persons who threatened him. This sort of
conduct takes this homicide out of the category of self-defense." Id
150 See Garrett Epps, Any Which Way But Loose: Interpretive Strategies and
Attitudes Toward Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American "Retreat Rule," 55
LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 303, 303-04 (1992) (describing the "easy case" of self-
defense-"'[a] traveler on a dark road is set upon by an armed stranger"--and contending
that "the majority of homicides take place after ambiguous confrontations between
persons who know each other and have a history of involvement and conflict.").
151 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Correa, 648 A.2d 1199, 1203 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)
(where victim came to defendant's apartment building, banged on the door, and yelled
threats, defendant was not entitled to claim self-defense because he let the victim into the
building). The court rejected defendant's claim that the victim posed a lethal threat. Id.
"Correa could not have believed that he was in imminent danger from behind a locked
door .... [Al reasonable person would have stayed upstairs, behind two locked doors,
and waited for the police to arrive." Id at 1202-03; see also Brown v. United States, 619
A.2d 1180, 1182 (D.C. 1992) ("The trial court under these circumstances properly
concluded that appellant had many options, such as entering his aunt's house, remaining
in his auto and driving directly home, or telephoning the police. .... Appellant cannot
raise a legitimate self-defense claim when he went out of his way to look for trouble.").
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ask whether the actor ought to have done something different that would
have avoided the situation is almost irresistible. 152
Such an unguided inquiry' 53 does, however, contain the potential for
biased and inconsistent application. If we compare the Adler case, discussed
supra, with the Laney case, we might conclude that the races of the
defendants and their assailants drove the very different results in those two
cases. In Adler, the defendant and Johnson, the deceased, "engaged in a
quarrel."'154 During the quarrel, Adler initiated aggressive behavior, tearing a
three-foot length of board from a fence and chasing Johnson with it.155
Johnson, in response, went into an alley and picked up some pieces of brick
and began throwing them at Adler. Adler ran into a grocery store, pursued by
Johnson "and another man, who had a knife open in his hand." In the
meantime, a mob had gathered, "yelling, 'Hit him!' 'Head him of 1.' 'Catch
him!' etc." 156 Adler stayed briefly in the store, then emerged "with a revolver
in his hand." About 200 persons had gathered.'15 7 Someone told Johnson that
Adler had a gun and was going to shoot. "Johnson was then from 80 to 90
feet from Adler, and began running, when Adler took after him, and fired
152 Consider, for example, the discussion of the Bernard Goetz case in Cynthia Kwei
Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness,
81 MiNN. L. REV. 367, 419 (1996):
An even stronger argument can be made that it was not necessary for Goetz to shoot
at the youths to defend himself Goetz could have chosen less violent means of
resolving the conflict. He could have said 'No' to the youths' demand for money. He
also could have moved to another section of the subway car-perhaps even another
car altogether. Goetz might have given the youths something less than the five
dollars they requested. Or, Goetz could have warned the youths not to bother him by
showing them his gun (not shooting it), and then he could have walked away.
Instead, Goetz's immediate response was to fire upon the youths ....
See also id at 435-46 (discussing another case and arguing that the defendant "easily
could have avoided any confrontation by permitting them to leave"); id. at 475 (arguing
for a "no less drastic alternatives" requirement for acts of self-defense based on a claim
of necessity and imminence).
153 See A.J. Ashworth, Self-Defence and the Right to Life, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 282,
287 (1975) (critiquing the reasonableness approach because "it says absolutely nothing
about either the rights and duties of the individual or the principles upon which actual
cases should be decided").
154 State v. Adler, 47 S.W. 794, 794 (Mo. 1898).
15 According to the court, he "ran Johnson across Sixth street, then west on the
same street; Adler pulling off, as he went along, a piece of plank, from three to four feet
in length, from a board fence or advertisement sign." Id.
16I.at 794-95.
157 Id at 795.
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two shots at him from a pistol." Shot in the back, Johnson died within five
minutes.
In both cases, an individual, pursued by a mob, responded to a lethal
threat with deadly consequences. In Adler, however, the mob was mostly
black, as was the victim, and the defendant was white.' 58 In Adler, the court
imposed no obligation on the defendant to avoid the altercation that resulted
in the loss of life, however foreseeable it might have been; it did not expand
the frame to require him to choose an alternative that would not be
provocative to his assailant; it did not suggest that his emerging from a place
of comparative safety-the store--with his weapon at the ready invited the
lethal affray.' 59 Our conclusions based on the "race-switching" nature of
these two cases 160 suggest that permitting decisionmakers the uncabined
discretion to expand or contract the frame in which they assess necessity
creates the opportunity to exercise bias and produce inequitable and unjust
results.16'
This is particularly troubling because the exercise of bias is most likely
to take hold in the closest and most difficult cases. This is a reflection of the
"liberation hypothesis," which suggests that, in cases where the facts are
strong or weak and very clear, the danger of discrimination or arbitrariness is
low, but where the facts are less clear, factfinders are "liberated" from the
159 Adler's conviction was, in fact, reversed, partly on the ground that one of the
instructions given unduly expanded the frame. Id. at 796.
160 See Lee, supra note 152, at 422 (suggesting that "race-switching ... can be a
useful vehicle to test whether racial stereotypes have influenced one's assumptions about
a given case."). For an example of judicial race-switching, see Rhodes v. State, 72 S.E.
518 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911).
161 The court recognized this concern in Goins v. State, 21 N.E. 476, 481 (Ohio
1889). Overturning the conviction of a black man who was accused of aiding and
abetting the murder of a member of a white mob that was attacking the defendant and his
companions, the court explicitly rejected a broad instruction requiring the jury to find that
defendant was "without fault, and in the peace of the state" before the defendant could
claim self-defense. The court concluded that the jury might have found this principle
violated based on the fact that
one of these colored men was drunk; one or more of the others slightly in liquor; that
their conduct was regarded as insolent and offensive; that they had been ordered to
go home by a peace officer--they may have well supposed that colored men so
conducting themselves were not free from fault and not in the peace of the state, and
therefore not clothed with the right of self-defense. The jury should have been made
to understand that .... [N]otwithstanding such conduct, the colored men, while in
the exercise of their lawfuil right to pass and repass along the streets of the town,
were still clothed by law with the right to defend themselves from the malicious and
violent attack of a numerous mob.
Id.
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grip of fact, resulting in an increased risk of arbitrariness or
discrimination. 16 2 The lack of clarity of the framing issue provides a high
degree of flexibility to the decisionmaker, creating the opportunity for the
exercise of bias in the hardest cases. 163
Expectations of reasonableness are situational and driven to some extent
by the stereotypic expectations of the decisionmaker; rather than permitting
the factfinder to choose how to frame the issue, the law should
unambiguously decide whether self-defense claims should be addressed
under a narrow or broad frame. The Article turns to that issue.
IV. SOLVING THE FRAMING DILEMMA: REJECTING THE BROAD FRAME
The broad framing inquiry has its appeal. The preservation of human life
is undoubtedly critical; if a person goes looking for an encounter that results
ultimately in the taking of human life, a broad frame suggests that he should
be punished for doing so. A rule that expands the frame and views earlier
choices to "look for trouble" as disqualifying the defendant from a self-
defense claim is, however, ultimately unjust.
A. Valuing the Dignitary Interest
Expanding the frame to penalize the defendant for prior choices that
placed him in harm's way winds up having a significant impact on that
actor's freedom. Requiring a defendant to avoid a situation which he knows
or should know may result in a violent encounter impairs his freedom of
movement and of choice. The frontier answer to this problem was to assert
unequivocally that an actor behaving lawfully need not avoid situations that
might be dangerous and need not go out of his way to avoid another person,
162 See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AmERICAN JURY 164-67 (1966).
In their view, "[tlhe closeness of the evidence makes it possible for the jury to respond to
sentiment by liberating it from the discipline of the evidence." Id. at 165. This insight
was repeated by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 325 n.4 (1987), noting that in cases where the evidence as to whether the
sentence should be death or life imprisonment was the closest, "impermissible factors
such as race play the most prominent role." My thanks to my colleague David Baldus for
this helpful analysis.
163 See DAviD C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 145 (1990) (in analyzing racial factors in the
application of the death penalty, "we found that when the crime involved was either
extremely aggravated or comparatively free from aggravating circumstances, the choice
between a life and a death sentence was relatively clear; and, regardless of racial factors,
Georgia prosecutors and juries responded accordingly. By contrast. ... in the
midaggravation range racial factors did play a significant role.").
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even one whom he knew might threaten him with unlawful force. 164
Adopting the expanded frame definitively rejects this rule.
Contemporary theorists would claim the change is justified, on the
ground that preservation of human life justifies some encroachments on the
freedom of the individual. Some commentators, for example, have contended
that the "sanctity-of-life" principle, as Prof. Kadish terms it, coupled with a
"'principle of equality," which recognizes that "all human lives must be
regarded as having an equal claim to preservation simply because life itself is
an irreducible value," and that "[t]he life of the good man and the bad man
stand equal,"' 65 require a retreat rule. Together, these values suggest that the
preservation of the life of anyone-even a wrongdoer-is superior to the
self-defender's interest in doing as he pleases. Contemporary scholars
describe this as an advance, reflecting greater solicitude for the value of any
human life, even the life of a wrongful aggressor.'16 6
The Model Penal Code, too, reflects this as a value; Section 3.04(b)(ii)
provides that the use of deadly force is not justifiable if "the actor knows that
he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety .. , by
complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no
duty to take."167 In other words, if an unlawful actor threatens an innocent
person with lethal force, but the threat can be avoided if the actor complies
with a demand that she abstain from some particular action, the innocent
person will not be entitled to claim self-defense if she resists complying with
the unlawful actor's demand and is threatened by that actor with lethal force.
Some state statutes have adopted this provision of the Code.'168
164 See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
165 Kadish, supra note 69, at 880.
166 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of
Self-Defense, 45 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (noting contemporary doctrine's
"humanist commitment" to attaching value to every life). The article suggests that
"temptations" to reject departures from these commitments should be avoided:
We do remain tempted to regard some important dignitary ends (honor, equality,
autonomy, and the like) as worthy of protection even at the expense of the lives of
those who threaten them. We understandably remain tempted to view the lives of
those who threaten those interests as worth less than those of persons who live
virtuous lives.
Id at 11.
167 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii).
168 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(b)(3) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. HI
§ 464(e)(2) (2008); HAw. REv. STAT. § 703-304(5)(b) (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 108(2)(C)(3)(c) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409(4)(b) (1975); N.J. REV.
STAT. 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b) (2005): 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(2)(ii) (1998). 1 have not
found a reported case applying any of these provisions.
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The drafters viewed this as a legitimate analogy to the requirement of
retreat, which the MEPG adopted. If the sanctity of life meant that a person
could be required to retreat, he could be required to do other things as
well. 169 This requirement of taking what the explanatory notes refer to as
&&alternative steps" 170 is premised on necessity; "there is no moral claim to
exoneration if the actor kills when he clearly need not do so in order to
protect himself-when, in other words, he knows that he can avoid the need
to kill at no risk to himself." 71
The Code avoided that result in one curious respect: it does not require
an actor to comply with affirmative, positive directions from the aggressor,
only to comply with a demand to refrain from action. "[N]o compliance with
a demand for positive conduct is required as an alternative to the use of
deadly force."'172 This made sense, in the drafters' view, because "the
possible situations that may be embraced in a demand that the actor perform
some positive action are infinite in number and variety," and might include a
demand that is "outrageous, a demand to which the only answer is that one
would rather die than comply."' 73 If the actor were commanded NOT to do
something, however, unless the actor had a legal duty to act, "he would be
required to abstain from other types of conduct when he knows that will
guarantee his complete safety."' 74
How would the MPG approach work in practice? Imagine that Mary is
leaving her home to walk to the grocery store when Tyrant, the neighborhood
bully, commands her, "Don't leave your house. If you do, I'll kill you."
Under the MPG, Mary would be required to obey this direction and stay
home if she wanted to retain the privilege of using lethal force in self-
169 "[Oince it has been decided that the actor should retreat before using deadly
force in defense, it seems to follow logically that he should refrain from specified
conduct on demand rather than use deadly force, provided that his abstention does not
involve him in the violation of law." MODEL PENAL CODE AN~D COMMENTARIMs, part 1,
vol. 2, at 59.
170 Id. at 33.
171 Id at 55.
12I.at 60.
173 MODEL PENAL CODE 26-27 (Tentative Draft No. 8) (1958). This language was
tamed a bit in the final version of the commentary, becoming "outrageous, a demand to
which the answer is that one would risk death rather than Comply." MODEL PENAL CODE
AND COMMENTARIEs, part 1, vol. 2, at 60.
174 These constraints, under the Model Code, apply only to the use of lethal force.
an aggressor demands that the actor not walk to a certain spot where he may
lawfully go, the actor may go there and may use moderate force if he believes it
necessary to defend himself while going there .... It is only if he must employ deadly
force to maintain his freedom of locomotion that the Code imposes a duty to abstain." Id.
at 61.
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defense-that is, if she wanted to walk to the store and, if set upon by Tyrant,
to be permitted to respond to Tyrant's unlawful use of lethal force against
her. If Mary proceeds to the store, is threatened with lethal force by Tyrant,
and in turn responds with lethal force, Mary's act will not be justified, even
though her act-walking on a public street-was entirely lawful, Tyrant was
a wrongdoer threatening the unlawful use of lethal force, and Mary did not
respond with lethal force until she was first threatened unlawfully with lethal
force. The drafters of the Model Penal Code and other contemporary
theorists viewed it as fair to constrain the freedom of an innocent actor if that
was necessary to avoid a lethal altercation.
One could reach the same result by expanding the frame. Asked whether
Mary could have avoided the situation, was "looking for trouble," or was
"free from fault in the difficulty," a factfinder might properly conclude that
Mary could have avoided the whole encounter simply by staying home. If
that analysis results in depriving Mary of the privilege of using force in self-
defense, Tyrant can control Mary's behavior, and, in effect, limit her freedom
of movement and of choice.'175
These approaches inappropriately undervalue that actor's dignitary
interest. By "dignitary interest," I mean the actor's interest in being permitted
to move about freely and to pursue those activities fundamental to a free
society, without being subjugated to the unlawful demands of another
actor. 17 6 To deny actors the claim of self-defense even in a situation in which
they respond to an unlawful threat of lethal force with lethal force, based on
their previous decisions to go to a place or to take an action that they were
legally permitted to take, constitutes a profound encroachment on the
dignitary interest. Any rule that constrains the law-abiding citizen's choice of
lawful options by requiring her to submit to the unlawful demands of others
in order to retain the privilege of self-defense improperly invades that
interest. Such a rule does not merely require such an actor to honor the
sanctity-of-life principle; it requires her to submit to the subjugation of an
aggressive and unlawful actor. This allows bullies effectively to require
175 The Model Penal Code's rule turns on the inherently unconvincing nature of the
distinction between positive commands and commands to abstain from conduct. Should
the situation be any different if Tyrant orders Mary to "stay in your house"!-an
affirmative act? The bully who commands, as you leave your home, "turn right, or I'll kill
you," is demanding positive conduct. Under the Code's formulation, an actor need not
turn right to be entitled to engage in self-defense. However, if the same bully
commanded, "don't turn left, or I'll kill you," the failure to turn right would deprive the
actor of the justification of self-defense if her noncompliance with the command resulted
in the need to use lethal force to save her own life.
176 Whether such a right has constitutional protection is explored in Mitchell F.
Crusto, Enslaved Constitution: Obstructing the Freedom to Travel, 70 U. Prrr. L. REv.
233 (2008).
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compliance with their demands.177 Those demands need not be spoken; they
can be implicit and still control the actor's behavior. The comments to the
tentative draft of the Model Rule made clear that this rule would apply
equally even in the absence of a command: "The same result follows, of
course, if there is no demand but the actor knows that he will be attacked if
he appears in a certain place."' 78
Yet this analysis fails to recognize that, if the actor's chosen course of
conduct is lawful, requiring her to avoid it in order not to be deemed to be
"looking for trouble" subordinates her free will to that of the wrongful actor.
It is the anticipated conduct of the wrongfuil actor that controls her behavior.
If the choice that the actor wishes to make is a lawful one, it is unclear why
another person's threatened unlawful and violent action should constrain her
personal freedom.
Some writers have trivialized the importance of the dignitary interest,
suggesting that it implies that any interference with one's choices in life,
however insignificant, justifies violence. Commentators are quick to
disparage these notions of dignitary rights, ridiculing the non-retreat rule, for
example, as the embarrassing residuary of pioneer machismo,' 79 and
suggesting that insistence on freedom of movement is trivial in relation to
177 prof. Catherine Carpenter makes a similar argument with regard to a battered
partner's obligation of retreat when both partners share a residence: a legal principle that
requires the battered spouse to retreat from the shared residence effectively gives the
aggressive spouse the power to require the peaceable spouse to leave. Carpenter, supra
note 66, at 690.
If the innocent cohabitant must retreat because the deadly cohabitant maintains
lawful possession, the deadly cohabitant has, in effect, ejected the innocent
cohabitant. By requiring the innocent cohabitant to flee, both the broadest form of
the cohabitant exception and the limited duty to retreat provide the deadly cohabitant
with an authority not granted the innocent cohabitant-the right to eject the other
party.
Id
178 MODEL PENAL CODE 27 (Tentative Draft No. 8) (1958).
179 See, e.g., RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, No DUTY To RETREAT 173 (199 1):
Is America entering a period of post-no duty to retreat in which standing one's
ground will have less and less appeal in a nation falling away from no duty to retreat
and its web of supporting valus?... Is a new cluster of values stressing peace
(rather than military combat), environmental preservation (instead of environmental
exploitation), cooperation (rather than competition), and gentle qualities (rather than
the norm of 'macho' masculinity) slowly but surely eroding the traditional American
value of no duty to retreat?
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protecting the aggressor's life.180 Consider, for example, the following
hypothetical, proffered by Prof. Alexander:
Suppose that I live in a town that is near an insane asylum. Further, suppose
that I ordinarily have the right to walk the streets freely and to resist
aggression. Now consider the situation when several homicidal lunatics
have escaped and have been observed going into the town. The police warn
all residents, including me, to stay in our homes for a few hours until they
can round up the escapees. Nevertheless, because I have a yen for taking a
stroll, and because I carry an automatic pistol for protection, I venture
outdoors and proceed to take my daily constitutional. Sure enough, I
encounter several knife-wielding lunatics who attack me, and I am forced to
kill them all.
I do not expect that many, if any, readers will find my conduct
justifiable. .... In the absence of some very compelling reason, my doing
what I ordinarily have a right to do, in a situation in which I know that I will
probably have to kill innocent, though aggressive, people in order to protect
my life, appears to be Wrong, not Right. 18 1
In this hypothetical, the desire of the actor to go where he wishes is
presented as trivial or even frivolous; it is plainly clear to the author that an
actor's "yen for taking a stroll" should not supersede the right to life of
innocent-even if homicidal-actors. The dignitary interest, in this context,
seems reduced to simple selfishness; it seems obvious that the whims of an
actor whose desire for unfettered freedom results in the loss of innocent lives
should be subordinated to the value of those lives.182 Nor is he alone;
contemporary scholars routinely diminish the significance of the dignitary
180 See, e.g., an instruction offered in an Alabama case: "No balm or protection is
provided for wounded pride or honor in declining combat, or sense of shame in being
denounced as cowardly. Such thoughts are trash, as compared with the inestimable right
to live." Springfield v. State, 11I So. 250, 252 (Ala. 1892).
181 Laurence A. Alexander, Justification and Innocent Aggressors, 33 WAYNE L.
REV. 1177, 1183-84 (1987).
182 Similar commentary exists criticizing the no-retreat rule:
A really honorable man, a man of truly refined and elevated feeling, would perhaps
always regret the apparent cowardice of a retreat, but he would regret ten times
more, after the excitement of the contest was past, the thought that he had the blood
of a fellow-being on his hands. It is undoubtedly distasteful to retreat; but it is ten
times more distasteful to kill.
Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARv. L. REv. 567, 581
(1902-03).
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interest in light of the much greater interest in the preservation of human
life. 183
While innocent aggressor hypotheticals are an effective tool for testing
the theoretical consistency of self-defense law, they are not a good basis for
shaping criminal law doctrine. 184 Aggressors are rarely innocent, which is
what makes these situations so peskily hypothetical. In the real world, the
dignitary interest is not simply about protecting the trivial right of an
uncaring citizen to do what he wishes, at the expense of an innocent actor.
Instead, it addresses the right to be free from the subjugation of an aggressor,
who is, as a practical matter, highly unlikely to be innocent. In that sense, the
dignitary interest is as much about constraining abusers of power as it is
about guaranteeing the freedom of those subjected to power. 18 5
A principle based on the need to preserve life at all costs seems
noncontroversial at first glance. But requiring an actor to avoid the resort to
lethal force by doing whatever he could have to avoid the critical encounter
permits the bully to rule the streets. In the context of the Laney case, the
mob, illegal actors all, were privileged in their threats; they could threaten
Laney with death without facing the risk of lawful force in response. The
law, in effect, made the obligation to avoid violence Laney's, not the mob's;
he lost the right to use self-defense by failing to avoid a confrontation. Taken
more broadly, the principle suggests that unlawful actors are privileged to
183 Ashworth argues that the dignitary interest of the actor is outweighed by the need
to preserve life: "I[Sjhould not the minimization of physical violation take precedence
over mere freedom of movement? Is there not some analogy with omissions to assist in
saving life, where a citizen's general liberty should also be outweighed by a specific
social duty?" Ashworth, supra note 46, at 119. Ashworth contends that the law imposes
no duty to avoid conflict "in those cases where D is acting lawfully in remaining at, or
going to, a place, realizing that there is a risk that someone will force a violent
confrontation there." Id.; see also Sangero, supra note 64, at 526 (in a criticism of the
autonomy theory of self-defense, "[a] third advantage ... is that the autonomy rationale
leads to the highest protection of the rights and liberties of law-abiding citizens.
However, protection of this maximum extent is not socially desirable, neither from the
perspective of values and morality nor from a practical perspective.").
184 The innocent aggressor problem is defined infra note 190.
185 A.J. Ashworth, supra note 153, at 283 ("[O]n practical grounds, a liberty to use
force in self-defence is essential if members of society are not to be put at the mercy of
the strong and unscrupulous."); see also State v. Bristol, 84 P.2d 757, 762 (Wyo. 1938)
(court rejects the argument that Bristol ought not to have gone to a restaurant when he
had been threatened with assault if he went there; court termed the issue "whether or not
the law can afford to encourage bullies to stalk about the land and terrorize citizens by
their mere threats"); DICEY', LAW & THE CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 1915) ("Discourage self-
help, and loyal subjects become the slaves of ruffians."); HERBERT STEPHEN, DIGEST OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW 125, 160 (6th ed. 1904) (if retreat were required, "it would follow
that any ruffian who chose to assault a quiet person in the street might impose upon him
the legal duty of running away.").
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compel obedience with their implied or explicit direction before a victim can
resort to the use of lethal force. The more predictably aggressive and violent
the unlawful actor is, the more significant becomes the threatened victim's
obligation to avoid him. That encroachment on human dignity exceeds what
ought to be required of an individual seeking the right to defend himself.
Scholars routinely recognize autonomy as a theoretical justification for
some aspects of self-defense doctrine.' 86 Such a theory looks to the
importance of permitting an individual the right to resist threats to his
autonomy imposed by unlawful aggression. 187 This notion that one has the
right to resist a wrongdoer is embodied in the prevention of felony aspect of
self-defense,'18 8 which permits lethal force to be used to resist certain violent
and forcible felonies, even if they do not include certain threats of death. It
also explains the "castle" doctrine,189 has been used to resolve the "innocent
aggressor" problem,' 90 and seems inherent in the recent surge of
186 It is sometimes named differently: Prof. Fletcher calls it the "autonomy interest,"
see Fletcher, supra note 64, at 860, while Prof. Nourse calls it the "libertarian approach,"
see Nourse, supra note 47, at 1273.
187 The autonomy principle has been criticized on the ground that it suggests no
proportionality limitation; any encroachment on the actor's autonomy could be answered
with lethal force. Alexander, supra note 181, at 1180. Prof. Fletcher's response to that
contention would be that the encroachment must be significant; not all minimal intrusions
on a person's autonomy may be answered with force. See George P. Fletcher,
Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITr. L. REv. 553, 560
(1996) ("every petty interference with ... autonomy" does not justify the use of lethal
force).
188 Consider, for example, LaFave and Scott's description of kidnapping and rape as
among "the most extreme intrusions on freedom of the person .. , even when the crime
does not threaten death or serious bodily harm." WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr,
JR., CRIMINAL LAW 456 n.i1 (2d ed. 1986).
189 This permits an individual in his home to resist unlawful entry, even in a
jurisdiction otherwise subscribing to the retreat requirement. Fletcher, supra note 64, at
861; Kadish, supra note 69, at 875.
190 See George P. Fletcher & Luis E. Chiesa, Self-Defense and the Psychotic
Aggressor, in CRimiNAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 365, 365 (Robinson, Ferzan, & Garvey,
eds. 2008). The "innocent aggressor" problem asks why an actor is justified in using
lethal self-defense against someone who, because of insanity or infancy, would be
excused in her use of lethal force. The problem is set out in George P. Fletcher,
Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal
Theory, 8 ISR. L. REV. 367, 371 (1973). Because the aggressor is excused and therefore
innocent, applying the equality of life principle suggests that the prospective victim's life
is no more worthy than that of the innocent aggressor. Authors Fletcher and Chiesa
suggest that it is the innocent aggressor's encroachment on the autonomy of the victim
that makes the victim's response justified rather than simply excused. Fletcher & Chiesa,
supra, at 3 69-7 1.
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"householder statutes," permitting the use of lethal force in self-defense
against home intruders and eliminating any obligation of retreat. 191
Autonomy, however, is sometimes articulated as a narrowly defined right
to physical integrity. As Prof. Fletcher described the principle, "[tlhe
underlying judgment must be that the victim has a right to the integrity and
autonomy of his body and that he has a right to prevent encroachments upon
his living space."' 92 The analogy is warfare, and the physical intrusion of the
aggressor into one's space constitutes a hostile enemy advance.' 93 The
dignitary interest, by contrast, extends more broadly to protect the actor's
right to engage in fundamental freedoms of choice and movement.
Absent this conclusion, the bad actor-the threatening bully--owns the
streets. In its early American development, self-defense law-in particular,
the arguments over the retreat requirement-focused on the actor's interest in
personal freedom, conceptualized this way.'94 The courts recognized the
191 See Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31
HARv. J.L. & GENDER 237, 263-64 (2008); Jason W. Bobo, Following the Trend:
Alabama Abandons the Duty to Retreat and Encourages Citizens to Stand Their Ground,
38 CumB. L. REv. 339, 359-64 (2008).
192 Fletcher, supra note 190, at 378; see also id, at 380 ("The intrusion upon
someone's living space itself triggers a justified response."); Mordechai Kremnitzer &
Khalad Ghanayim, Proportionality and the Aggressor's Culpability in Self-Defense, 39
TULSA L. REv. 875, 881 (2004) (describing protector of autonomy as a person who has
not "invaded anyone else's personal space" and "who wishes to defend his own personal
space."). The authors later suggest a broader definition of autonomy--"protection of [the
actor's] legitimate interests," id at 882, but then state that if self-defense protects
autonomy, a vigorous duty of retreat should apply. 1d. at 882-83. An understanding of
autonomy as protecting the actor's right to freedom of movement is not particularly
consistent with a strong retreat requirement. See also id. at 883 ("protecting autonomy" is
defined as "the defending of personal legitimate interests of the victim").
193 Fletcher, supra note 64, at 862.
194 See, e.g., State v. Bristol, 84 P.2d 757, 762 (Wyo. 1938). In rejecting the
contention that the defendant had an obligation to avoid going to a restaurant where he
knew an aggressor who had previously threatened him might be, the court argued:
The State thinks that he should have gone home, instead of going to the restaurant.
The jury doubtless took that view, and it is not improbable that the fact that he did
not go home was the most potent factor in convicting the defendant. And, ethically
speaking, that, perhaps, is what he should have done.
1d, The issue, however, required consideration of
ethics and public policy as well. It involves the balancing of the interests between
liberty and freedom of movement and the restraint thereof. It involves the question
as to whether or not the law can afford to encourage bullies to stalk about the land
and terrorize citizens by their mere threats. We hesitate to lay down a rule which
would do that.
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autonomy concern not only because of what such a rule meant to the actor
forced to flee rather than defend, but what such a rule would mean for a
society, largely distant from and unregulated by law enforcement, if unlawfuil
actors knew that the law required their victims to flee rather than defend
themselves. 195 It was that subjugation of the potential innocent victim by the
unlawful actor-and the consequences it created for society-to which some
courts looked in rejecting the retreat requirement. 196
To contemporary theorists, these concerns may seem archaic, and
relevant only to a frontier culture. But dignitary interests can be equally
threatened on the streets of the contemporary American city. Recently, a
federal judge reached the same conclusion in a self-defense case that arose
on the streets of New York. In Davis v. Strack,197 Davis, a twenty-three-year-
Id; see also State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679, 702 (1882) (nonretreat rule "is at least the
surest to prevent the occurrence of occasions for taking life; and this by letting the would-
be robber, murderer, ravisher, and such like know, that their lives are in a measure in the
hands of their intended victims"); Fletcher, supra note 64, at 866 (nineteenth-century case
law "was divided, as might be predicted, but the weight of authority appeared to favor the
principle of autonomy. This commitment to autonomy was expressed in the recurrent line
of the opinions that if the defendant was 'in a place that he had a right to be,' then he had
the right to stand his ground and vindicate his autonomy.").
195 Lance K. Stell, Close Encounters of the Lethal Kind& The Use of Deadly Force in
Self-Defense, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 120 (1986):
In an environment which is known to contain aggressors, prohibiting lethal self-help
penalizes the law-abiding by causing aggressors to fear defensive violence from the
police only and not from their law-abiding victims. It seems objectionable for the
law to permit aggressors to gain so much from their victim's disposition to be law-
abiding.
One author terms this "rule consequentialism"-the notion that legalizing self-defense
will serve as a deterrent to wrongful actors and, in the long run, save lives. FIONA
LEvERiCK, KILLING IN SELF-DEFENSE 48-49 (2006).
196 Another way to think about this might be to ask what rule would produce the
fewest wrongful lethal events. See Stell, supra note 195, at 119 (the question another
author wants to ask is, "What lethal force rule will, over the long pull, produce the least
amount of wrongful and (potentially) deadly violence in society?"). Stell deems this a
pertinent question to theorists of all sorts, but suggests that answering this question would
not necessarily produce the right result: "Presumably, rational, self-interested persons
have an indirect interest in various policies' social welfare effects, but they are also
interested in exercising and protecting their own autonomy." Id On the frontier, it might
have been plausible to conclude that limiting lethal response to unlawful aggressors
would encourage their behavior, leading, in the long run to more rather than less
wrongful aggression. One author deems this the "consequentialist approach," based on
the premise that, "when faced with a choice between the death of the aggressor and the
death of the victim, the aggressor's death is the preferable consequence." Leverick, supra
note 195, at 45.
197 270 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2001).
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old numbers runner, fatally shot the victim, known as "Bubblegum," a 435-
pound man six feet tall who had previously robbed Davis three times at
gunpoint, had recently raped him, and had threatened to kill Davis when he
saw him next.198 On the occasion of the homicide, Davis "came out of a
grocery store on the southwest comner of 146th Street and Amsterdam
Avenue. As he talked there with a friend, he saw Bubbeumn.... Davis was
frightened. He went around the corner to get a gun for his protection."199
Davis returned to the street and there was a confrontation; Davis shot
Bubblegumn in the back and killed him.200 The trial court refused to instruct
the jury on a justification defense, on the ground that Davis had an
affirmative obligation to avoid an encounter with Bubblegum.201 "[I1nstead
of going away from .. . where he knows the danger is ... he walked towards
Amsterdam Avenue .... [W]hen he gets to Amsterdam Avenue and 146th
Street he sees the deceased a block away on 147th street [sic] . .. [H]e did
not walk back to where he knew was a safe avenue." 202 The state appellate
court held that, because New York law imposed a duty to retreat, Davis's
return (with a gun) to a place where he might face a risk violated his
obligation to retreat.203 in overturning the conviction on federal habeas, the
author of the appellate opinion recognized the critical importance of Davis's
dignitary interest:
The evidence showed that the 146th Street and Amsterdam neighborhood
was the center of Davis's life. That was where he earned his living as a
numbers runner. That, it appeared, was his social center. The evidence
shows it was also the place where the vicious Bubblegum hung out. If the
law required Davis to retreat whenever Bubblegum was present on the
block-as opposed to only when he faced an imminent threat of violence-
Davis would be forced to leave the social and business center of his life on
pain of forfeiting the legal right to defend himself against a deadly attack by
a repeat tormentor. The law would essentially give over ascendancy to the
bullies of the world.
For the situation Davis faced was not momentary. Had Davis left that
evening on seeing Bubblegum, he would presumably have seen Bubblegum
again on his return the next day, or the day after, and the same choice
whether to leave on the chance that Bubblegum might attack him would
present itself. The trial court's interpretation would ultimately mean that
victims of threats of violence must either give up their habitat or lose their
198 Id at 116.
99I.at 118-19.
20I.at 120.
201 This obligation was premised on the duty to retreat. See id at 120.
203 Davis, 270 F.3d at 121.
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right to self defense. That is not the law of New York. Davis was not
obligated to withdraw from the place where he made his life, on pain of
losing his right of self defense, merely because a tormentor who had
threatened to kill him was also to be found on the same streets. 204
This encroachment on the dignitary interest might be justified if the
victims of this type of subordination had an alternative remedy through law
enforcement. As the next section shows, this seems unlikely.
B. Law Enforcement as an Inadequate Substitute
One theory about the legitimacy of self-defense is that the defender is
acting for the state as law enforcer in those instances where the state's
enforcement mechanisms are inadequately protective of individual rights.205
This explains some constraints on the doctrine, such as the requirement of
imminence; self-defense is available only where the state does not provide
adequate protection or is not otherwise competent to protect the individual in
a timely fashion.206
24I.at 128 n.6. Though Judge Leval wrote this opinion for a three-judge panel, he
noted that in making these comments in particular, he was "speaking for himself alone."
Id
205 See, e.g., Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra note 192, at 899:
[S]elf-defense is intended to preserve the legal order by granting every person the
right to fend off unlawful attacks. Protecting the legal order is, first and foremost,
the role of the state, by means of its law enforcement agencies. This derives from the
state's absolute monopoly over the use of force. The right to employ force under
conditions of self-defense is a right that is derived from the state's right and duty to
preserve the legal order. It is an exception to the prohibition upon the use of force by
individuals. A person acting in self-defense is a 'substitute policeman.'
206 Fletcher, supra note 187, at 570:
[W]hen an attack against private individuals is imminent, the police are no longer in
a position to intervene and exercise the state's fuinction of securing public safety.
The individual right to self-defense kicks in precisely because immediate action is
necessary. Individuals do not cede a total monopoly of force to the state. They
reserve the right when danger is imminent and otherwise unavoidable to secure their
own safety against aggression.
See also Fletcher, supra note 64, at 867, describing Blackstone's view:
The function of the law is to provide redress for the violation of rights, but not to
protect and approve the vindication of rights jeopardized by the aggression of others.
According to this view of necessary defense, the private use of force is tolerated
only because the state fails in its task of providing protection against aggression. If
the privilege of necessary defense is derivative of the state's monopoly of force, then
the regulation of the defense invariably reflects the interest both of the aggressor and
the defender. If the latter can save the life of the former by retreating from the
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Scholars have questioned whether, "where there is a gap between the
theory of state protection and the reality of police indifference," 207 we should
recognize a different and perhaps broader right of self defense. 208 Expanding
the frame to deprive an actor of a self-defense claim if he fails to yield to
encroachments on his dignitary interest is not reasonable if law enforcement
is unlikely to provide a solution to the problem. Diffuse threats of future
violence and intimidation may present situations which law enforcement
does not address very effectively. Moreover, the victims of such threats may
hesitate to involve police. In the Davis case, for example, Davis did not
report Bubblegum's violent assaults to the police: "[h]e believed the police
would be unsympathetic to a numbers runner and would do little to protect
him. Also, Davis feared that if he reported the incidents Bubblegum would
retaliate." 209
A broad framing rule might make sense if the goal were to prevent
vigilantism in an environment with a vigorous and responsive law
enforcement presence. Supporters of the Model Penal Code rule, requiring an
actor to submit to an order to refrain from doing something or forego his
right of self-defense, 210 suggest precisely this. Prof. Robinson argues that the
Model Penal Code rule is mitigated "by the fact that [defendant's] freedom
of movement may be restricted only until he notifies the authorities of [the
aggressor's] threat."21' This assumes that upon being informed of such a
threat, the police would move with alacrity to protect the dignitary interests
of the actor reporting such intimidation. The context of the cases discussed in
this article makes clear the fallacy inherent in this notion. Mob violence, like
that at issue in Laney, or individual intimidation, like that in Davis, seem
singularly unsusceptible to effective law enforcement control.212 There is no
conflict, the greater social good requires him to withdraw. Blackstone's view of the
state as the vindicator of our rights leads us to the denial of personal autonomy as a
relevant premise in the theory of self-defense.
207 Fletcher, supra note 187, at 571.
209 Davis, 270 F.3d at 117.
2 10 TeModel Penal Code rule is discussed supra notes 167-74 and accompanying
text.
211 Robinson, supra note 72, at 87. Robinson goes on to recognize that the
assumption that "authorities will take the matter seriously and will be able to resolve it"
might be incorrect. Id
212 The riots at issue in Laney were plainly beyond the control of law enforcement.
In the words of the Washington Post: "Blazing race hatred turned the streets of
Washington into battlefields last night. Surging mobs of blacks and whites proved
themselves stronger than the law in the nation's capital." CHALMERS M. ROBERTS, TuE
WASHINGTON POST: THE FIRST 100 YEARS 152 (Houghton Mufflin 1977).
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little irony in limiting individuals' access to self-defense most aggressively in
circumstances in which reliance on law enforcement is least likely to help
them.
Up until this point, this Article has not focused on the elephant in the
room and the subject of vast quantities of recent scholarship: the issue of
assertions of self-defense by victims of domestic violence. An advocate of
domestic violence victims might contend that broad frames benefit such
defendants, by contextualizing the violent environment in which they found
themselves, and that a narrow frame would accordingly disadvantage them. I
have two responses to such arguments. The first is that a broad frame is not
invariably beneficial to a domestic violence victim claiming self-defense. In
some situations, framing could be a technique by which victims of domestic
violence might be deprived of the privilege of lethal force in self-defense. If,
for example, the jury in such a case were instructed that the victim had a duty
to avoid the situation, a factfinder might deprive her of the defense if she
could have left the home but did not.2 13 Using an expanded frame to deprive
such an actor of a claim of self-defense would encroach on the dignitary
interest of such a victim. The second response is that the dignitary interest
requires only that an individual not be deprived of a self-defense claim based
on choices or decisions within the expanded frame. Some asymmetry might
be legitimate, however. It might be appropriate to consider evidence of
earlier events or decisions to contextualize a self-defense claim, as long as
that evidence was not used to preclude the claim.
C. Asymmetry Between Conduct and Result
The conclusion that the expanded frame permits the factfinder to
consider earlier conduct by the defendant to determine whether the defendant
could have avoided the encounter may result in a finding of no necessity and
an absolute bar to a claim of self-defense. In that sense, the framing decision
is outcome-determinative. The actor whose conduct is deemed unnecessary
213 Arthur Ripstein, Self-Defense and Equal Protection, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 685, 702
(1996):
Any explanation we might give of her failure to leave the relationship earlier is not
to the point-at the moment of choice, she had only two options. Some of the
factors that limited her ability to leave the relationship earlier continue to be
relevant, including the likelihood of later attacks. But other factors, such as her fear
of social stigma, however significant they may be to her earlier failure to leave, are
not sufficient to establish that she had no choice but to kill or be killed.
Understanding those fears explains how she could have stayed in a situation that led
to her moment of decision, but the justification for taking her abuser's life depends
on her alternatives at the last moment.
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by virtue of the framing choice has no justification claim. This is true even
though there is ordinarily no analysis of the culpability, accompanying the
earlier decision.
Permitting an expanded frame to deprive a defendant of a claim of self-
defense accordingly can result in a disproportionate penalty for the actor's
conduct. The loss of the self-defense privilege can be based on decisions to
engage in lawful conduct with an uncertain and unanalyzed culpability. In a
situation where lethal self-defense is at issue, the choice to walk down a
particular street or to open the door to what might otherwise have been an
avoidable conflict can result in a conviction for murder.214
Prof. Paul Robinson identified this problem-in a categorical sense-in
his article, Causing the Conditions of One 's Own Defense: A Study in the
Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine.215 The article discussed a range
of doctrines which deny an actor a defense when the actor played some role
in creating the situation that led to the ultimate criminal act, and recognized
that these doctrines deprive an actor of recourse to a defense without
considering that actor's culpability. 216 Prof. Robinson's suggested solution
was to expand the time frame, rather than to contract it, and to look to the
actor's conduct and culpability at the time of the creation of the initial
condition, rather than at the time of the ultimate justified or excused criminal
act, as the basis for imposing criminal liability.2 17
The first half of Prof. Robinson's argument-that using prior conduct as
a basis for completely depriving an actor of what would otherwise be a valid
defense is inappropriate-is consistent with the analysis here. His second
suggestion-that liability should instead be imposed based on the actor's
earlier conduct, as long as it was accompanied by the appropriate mental
state-is uncontroversial in theory, though more problematic in application
214 Prof. Paul Robinson recognized this problem:
The "at fault" provisions, even at best, are defective because they are oversimplified.
Although apparently based on principles of fault and blameworthiness, these
provisions actually avoid the relevant inquiry-the actor's culpability as to
committing the offense-and instead rely on rough-and-ready rules that only
roughly approximate the results dictated by the culpability principle.
Paul Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits Of
Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1985). Another concern is the
relative culpability of the victim and the defendant and whether the victim's conduct
should be considered in determining the liability of the perpetrator. For an extensive
discussion of the issue, see generally VERA BERGELSON, VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND VICTIMS'
WRONGS: COMPARATIVE LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW (2009).
215 Id.
26I.at 10--14.
27I.at 27-38.
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than his analysis recognizes. Prof. Robinson argues that if X engages in
conduct-even lawful conduct-with the intent that it will move another
person, Y, to assault him unlawfully and entitle him to use lethal force
against Y, then X should be guilty of murder if he incites Y, Y responds as
predicted, and X kills Y in what would otherwise be justifiable self-defense.
This is not a convincing solution, for a number of reasons. First, as a
practical matter, proof of such elaborate intent as the basis for a murder
conviction seems more likely to be the basis of a Law & Order subplot than
an actual homicide case.218 Second, and more critical, is the problem of
causation. If X taunts Y, and Y responds with unlawful violence, at which
point X kills Y in self-defense, Prof. Robinson would say that X's initial
taunt should be the basis for imposing criminal liability on X, assuming that
X knew that Y would respond with lethal force to his taunts. It is at least
possible, however, that Y's unlawful and homicidal act is a supervening
cause of his own death. It may have been foreseeable that he would act
unlawfully, but his decision is an act of "free, deliberate and informed"
human intervention which can break the causal chain.219
More significant, for the purposes of this article, Prof. Robinson fails to
recognize the dignitary interest. If X knows that Y will assault him if he goes
to the grocery store, yet X goes to the grocery store, Prof. Robinson would
view this as an appropriate instance for imposing criminal liability on X
based on his decision to go to the store (assuming the anticipated lethal
encounter ensues and X kills Y in self-defense).
We could instead analogize the actor deprived of his self-defense claim
based on his prior conduct to the initial aggressor, who is not privileged to
rely on self-defense notwithstanding the fact that he faces, at the time he acts,
an imminent and unlawful threat of lethal force. Initial aggression is an "on-
off' switch; absent affirmative withdrawal from the encounter, an actor's
status as an initial aggressor entirely precludes relying on a claim of self-
defense. 220
218 Prof. Robinson recognizes the proof problems inherent in such an approach, and
proposes a range of presumptions, of admittedly dubious constitutionality, to solve the
prosecution's problem. Id at 58-60.
219 DRESSLER, supra note 23, § 14.03 [C] [6]. The problem is exacerbated because the
statute Prof. Robinson proposed uses the phrase "causes the circumstances that justify
his ... engaging in the conduct that constitutes the offense," leaving a factfinder to parse
out what "causes the circumstances" means and to distinguish that from the legal concept
of proximate causation. Robinson, supra note 214, at 50.
220 Fletcher, supra note 64, at 858:
The factor that skews the balancing in favor of the defender is the aggressor's
culpability in starting the fight. As the party morally at fault for threatening the
defender's interests, the aggressor is entitled to lesser consideration in the balancing
process. His interests are discounted, as it were, by the degree of his culpability. The
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As a theoretical matter, how should we understand the loss of the
privilege of self-defense to an initial aggressor? One theory is that the initial
aggressor is an unlawful actor; the response of the victim to that unlawful
aggression is therefore lawful, and the initial aggressor has no right to use
self-defense to resist lawful force. 221 In that sense, the interaction is a
transfer of the privilege of self-defense from one to the other. The unlawful
behavior of the initial aggressor creates a situation in which the victim is
privileged to respond in self-defense, but the aggressor is not. If the victim
responds disproportionately-as by responding with lethal force to a non-
lethal threat-he becomes the unlawful actor. The victim's use of force
would then be unjustified.222 One article refers to this as the "innocents
preferred" principle, which provides that, in an encounter, only a non-
aggressor is privileged to violate the underlying "core principle" that "killing
is bad."1223 Even though necessity might subsequently justify his acting in
self-defense, the initial aggressor must disavow his status as wrongdoer to
regain the privilege.
It is unfair to treat our expanded-frame defendants as analogous to initial
aggressors for several reasons. First, the initial aggressor engages in unlawful
behavior. That triggering decision to engage in illegality is the wrong that
denies the actor the right of self-defense. In the context of framing, however,
extent to which his life is discounted determines whether the defender may use
deadly force to defend against rape, serious bodily harm, loss of irreplaceable
property and even, possibly, the loss of less important interests. The underlying
premise is that if someone culpably endangers the interests of another, his interests
are less worthy of protection.
221 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 10.4(e) (footnotes omitted):
It is generally said that one who is the aggressor in an encounter with another-i.e.,
one who brings about the difficulty with the other-may not avail himself of the
defense of self-defense. Ordinarily, this is certainly a correct statement, since the
aggressor's victim, defending himself against the aggressor, is using lawful, not
unlawful, force; and the force defended against must be unlawful force, for self-
defense.
The exception is the case in which "both parties are in the wrong," PERKINs & BOYCE,
supra note 48, at 1129, in which neither party is privileged to use deadly force in self-
defense. Mutual combat is the most common such situation. Id at 1129 n.92.
222 Another approach suggests discounting-that "by acting as an initial aggressor,
the actor devalues his life relative to that of the defendant." Leverick, supra note 195, at
46.
223 David McCord & Sandra K. Lyons, Moral Reasoning and the Criminal Law:
The Example of Self-Defense, 30 Am. GRIM. L. REv. 97, 132 (1992). This theory, McCord
and Lyons argue, is supported by Aquinian moral theory, which provided that "an
innocent, who is not violating God's will, is in a superior moral position to an aggressor,
who is violating God's will. Thus, the innocent who is attacked can legitimately act to
save his own life." 1d. at 132.
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the conduct that can deprive an actor of the privilege of self-defense may be
entirely lawful. Treating the failure-to-avoid actor as the equivalent of an
initial aggressor fails to recognize that choices inside the broad frame may be
significantly more ambiguous. "[T]he correct moral answers are not
transparently obvious.... [Tlhere are conflicts between the moral claims of
the alleged wrongdoer and those of the alleged victim."224
Second, as Prof. Waldron has noted, initial aggressors are different
because they pose an ongoing threat to the safety of others:
[T]he real reason for preferring the safety of the innocent to that of the
aggressor is the continued threat that aggressors usually pose. In most
circumstances, the survival of the guilty amounts to a threat not only to the
particular innocent person whom he confronts, but also to other innocent
people in the fuur.... It follows that the victim of an attack, who fights
back in self defense, is acting on account of all who might be threatened in
the future, rather than simply for himself.2 25
In view of these differences, perhaps the better analogy in the broad
framing situation would be the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. A
defendant who honestly but unreasonably believes that she faces an
imminent threat of unlawful lethal force, and who responds, in turn, with
deadly force, has been negligent. She failed to perceive the facts as they
actually were, when a reasonable person in her situation would have done so.
Should this deprive her entirely of the claim of self-defense? Some
jurisdictions recognize a partial defense for such actors. They are not fully
exonerated, because their belief in the need for the use of lethal force was
unreasonably held. They are not fully culpable, either, because they
genuinely believed they needed to use lethal force to save their own lives.
Instead, these jurisdictions provide a partial mitigation defense in such a
situation, reducing what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter.226 The
Model Penal Code treats the actor claiming self-defense whose belief in the
need for the use of force is negligently or recklessly held as having no
defense to a reckless or negligent crime.227
24I.at 100.
225 Jeremy Waldron, Self-Defense: Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Accounts, 88
CAL. L. REv. 711, 735 (2000).
226 DRESSLER, supra note 23, § 18.03. Prof. Dressler criticizes the denomination of
this mitigation as "imperfect self-defense," since it is inherently contradictory to deem an
act self-defense, yet punish it. Id; see also LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 10.4(i).
227 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2). Dressler's view is that this is "sensible," because:
[T]he traditional common law rule, which does not recognize an imperfect defense,
authorizes D's conviction for a more serious offense than his overall culpability-he
may be convicted of a crime of intent, although he is really a negligent or reckless
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If lawful acts taken within the broader frame are to be considered at all in
assessing the defendant' s criminal responsibility, they should only be held to
diminish, not to deny, a claim of self-defense. In such a situation, the failure
to avoid the situation, rather than creating an absolute bar to a justification
defense, might establish a lesser degree of culpability.228 Requiring such
culpability would impose some limits on the degree of encroachment on the
dignitary interest permitted by broad drawing of the frame.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the law regarding the framing of self-defense
cases is fundamentally chaotic. Instructions permit and decisions conclude,
variously, either that a person may be deprived of the privilege of self-
defense by going to the wrong place at the wrong time or that she may not.
The law should provide a clearer answer to whether the self-defense problem
should be framed to deny the actor the privilege of self-defense based on
earlier choices that might be viewed as "looking for trouble."
The Article argues not just that the rule on framing should be clear, but
that the question should not be framed to deny an actor the privilege of self-
defense based on a decision to go somewhere or do something lawful that the
actor had a right to do. To bar the claim of self-defense under those
circumstances would be to privilege the wrongfuil actor, to permit the bully to
rule the streets, and to permit a fundamental encroachment on the dignitary
interests of innocent actors. If we understand an invasion of the dignitary
interest as a problem of subordination and subjugation, it is easier to
understand why the answer that preserves life is not necessarily always the
optimal choice. The law of self-defense should take more reliable account of
the dignitary interest, and recognize the framing difficulties that implicate it.
Instructions that more clearly constrain the power of factfinders to consider a
broad frame in assessing whether the exercise of self-defense was
"4necessary"~ or "reasonable" or in some other context ultimately protect the
interest, not simply in doing what one pleases, but in preventing the
subjugation of one person at the unlawful hands of another. Law enforcement
may not be very effective at addressing ambiguous threats of future harm or
intimidation, making loss of the self-defense claim under these circumstances
wrongdoer.. .. The Code approach permits conviction of an offense in accord with
the culpability of his mistake.
DRESSLER, supra note 23, § 18.06[B].
228 See Robinson, supra note 214, at 10 ("[A]n approach that excludes a defense
because the actor was at fault in causing the defense"~ is problematic because "such an
approach does not distinguish among different levels of fault in causing the conditions of
the defense.").
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particularly problematic. Ultimately, depriving the actor of a self-defense
claim under these circumstances makes the actor responsible for a justifiable
act of violence based solely on an earlier decision not to avoid a
confrontational situation with an unlawful aggressor. The actor's culpability
in such a situation may be unclear and should not be the basis to deny the
claim of self-defense to an otherwise justified actor.
Critics may suggest that this Article permits lethal force to be used in
response to petty encroachments on dignity and autonomy. 229 In fact, it does
nothing of the kind. The Article does not argue that the actor who is
threatened or commanded to behave (or avoid behaving) in a certain way,
may respond to that encroachment on his autonomy with lethal force. It
argues only that those threats or commands by an unlawful actor should not
constrain the dignitary freedoms of the threatened person. The conduct of the
actor who goes to the place where a dangerous encounter may ensue is not a
prohibited "preemptive strike,"230 in which the person fearing an attack acts
first, deciding "it is wiser to strike first than to wait until the actual
aggression." 23' Nor is the actor using lethal force to prevent minor intrusions
to autonomy. The question in the framing cases is not "whether a history of
abuse and domination justifies retaliatory action by the subordinated
party."1232 It does not. The issue therefore is not, "If the local bully threatens
to harm you if you go to the grocery store, may you shoot him?" Instead, it is
simply whether you may go to the grocery store, bringing with you your
privilege to engage in self-defense. The answer to that question should
unquestionably be yes.
229 Fletcher, supra note 187, at 560 (instances of petty theft or inappropriate
touching probably would not justify the use of lethal force; a woman "may kill to ward
off a threat to her sexual autonomy, but she has no license to take life in order to avoid
every petty interference with her autonomy").
230 Id at 556-57.
231 Id. at 557.
22I.at 576.
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